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Abstract
This thesis discusses three cases related to microeconomics in dynamic frameworks. It consists
on the following chapters:
First chapter studies the optimal selling mechanism for a seller who puts up for sale one individual
unit per period to a single buyer in a two-period game. The buyers willingness to pay remains
constant over time and is his private information. In the rst period, the seller can commit to a
mechanism for the current period but not for the second one. The main result is that the seller
cannot achieve greater payo¤s than those obtained by posting a price in each period. However, price
posting is not optimal if the buyer is su¢ ciently impatient relative to the seller. Finally, it is shown
that a mechanism à la Goethe (see Moldovanu and Tieztel 1998) is almost optimal.
Second chapter studies the previous model in a multi-period setting when seller and buyer are
equally patient. In the two-period model, the degree of that patience did not a¤ect the set of feasible
mechanisms. However, with more than two periods, a larger patience of players do a¤ects this set.
In particular, some price posting mechanisms that were optimal when players were impatient are not
longer feasible when they are su¢ ciently patient. Additionally, with more than two periods, the seller
could engage in gradual learning. The main result is that a seller cannot do better than posting a price
in every period. There is also a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism and equilibrium
payo¤s for every prior. Finally, it shows that when seller and buyer are arbitrarily patient, the seller
does not learn about buyers type except in extreme cases, posting a price equal to the minimum
buyers willingness to pay in every period. This result is a reminiscence of the Coases conjecture,
where a monopolist cannot exert her monopoly power due to the lack of long-term commitment.
Third and last chapter proposes a model where rms, which compete for high-skill workers, can
distort their production in order to conceal information to the market about the skill of their workers.
This occur in a framework where rms di¤er in their marginal labor productivity and workers in
their skill. The main result is that rms actually distort their production and that these distortions
are not monotonic in the marginal labor productivity.
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Resumen
Esta tesis discute tres casos relacionados a la microeconomía en entornos dinámicos estructurada
de la siguiente manera:
El primer capítulo estudia el mecanismo de venta óptimo de un vendedor que vende una sola
unidad por período a un único comprador en un juego de dos períodos. La disponibilidad a pagar
de este comprador se mantiene constante en el tiempo y es su información privada. En el primer
período, el vendedor se puede comprometer a un determinado mecanismo para dicho período pero
no para el siguiente. El resultado principal es que el vendedor no logra obtener mejor rentabilidad
que la obtenida mediante el uso de un precio en cada período. Sin embargo, usar un precio no es
óptimo si el comprador es lo sucientemente impaciente en comparación al vendedor. Finalmente,
se muestra que un mecanismo à la Goethe(ver Moldovanu y Tieztel 1998) es cuasi-óptimo.
El segundo capítulo estudia el modelo anterior en un entorno con mucho períodos, siendo el
vendedor y el comprador igualmente pacientes. En el modelo de dos períodos, el grado de paciencia
no afectaba el conjunto de mecanismos factibles. Sin embargo, con más de dos períodos, una mayor
paciencia de los jugadores sí afecta dicho conjunto. En particular, algunos mecanismos de precios que
son óptimos cuando los jugadores son impacientes ya no son viables cuando son los sucientemente
pacientes. Adicionalmente, con más de dos periodos, el vendedor podría emplear un proceso de
aprendizaje gradual. El resultado principal es que el vendedor no puede hacerlo mejor que cuando
usa un precio en cada período. Se incluye una caracterización completa del mecanismo óptimo y de
los pagos de equilibrio para cada creencia a priori. Finalmente se muestra que, cuando el vendedor
y el comprador son arbitrariamente pacientes, el vendedor no logra aprender sobre la disponibilidad
a pagar del comprador excepto en casos extremos, usando en cada período un precio igual a su
mínima disponibilidad de pago. Este resultado es reminiscente de la conjetura de Coase, en el cual
un monopolista no puede ejercer su poder de monopolio debido a la falta de compromiso a largo
plazo.
El tercer y último capítulo propone un modelo en el cual las rmas, que compiten por trabajadores
altamente cualicados, pueden distorsionar su producción con el objetivo de ocultar información al
mercado sobre las cualicaciones de sus trabajadores. Esto ocurre en un entorno en el cual las
rmas dieren en su productividad marginal del trabajo y los trabajadores en sus cualicaciones. Se
muestra que dichas distorsiones ocurren y que no son monótonas en la productividad marginal del
trabajo.
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Chapter 1
Optimal Selling Mechanism in a
Repeated Game under Imperfect
Commitment: The Two-Period Case
1.1 Introduction
In 1797, Goethe was in the process of trying to sell his most recent work, the epic poem Hermann
and Dorothea. However, he was concerned about the information asymmetry between him and the
publisher with respect to the publishers valuation of his work.1 Goethe decided to propose the
following selling mechanism: each one (Goethe and the publisher) would send a sealed note with
their demanded price to a lawyer; the sale would take place at Goethes price only in the case that
the publishers demanded price was higher than or equal to Goethes demanded price.2 With this
mechanism, Goethe wanted to learn something about the publishers valuation and obtain some
advantage in future transactions.
Goethes story illustrates a common situation in the market place. A seller wants to sell something
to a buyer whose willingness to pay is private. However, the seller may use information from past
sales to the same buyer to infer his willingness to pay. This is reminiscent of the problem that
rms currently face when trying to record information about individual consumer behavior. Due
to new technologies such as online purchases or delity programs, it seems a pervasive problem.
With these technologies sellers want to learn consumer preferences. Tesco, the largest retailer in
Britain demonstrates a good example of these learning attempts through a delity program.3 This
is currently a practice that is becoming the norm in retail and is not restricted to large chains. Zen
Nippon Shokuhin, a small grocery club in Japan, follows Tescos example: it collects and analyzes
data from its customers to learn their preferences.4
1See Moldovanu, B. and Tieztel, M. (1998) for the complete story.
2As Moldovanu and Tietzel (1998) pointed this is a second-price auction in which the sealed reserve price of the
seller has the e¤ect of a second bidder.
3See The Economist, (2005).
4See The Economist, (2011).
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On principle, knowledge of consumer preferences can be used by rms to implement pricing
schemes that better discriminate among consumers. However, from a theoretical point of view, this
is not obvious because consumers (and the publisher in Goethes case) may have incentives to act
strategically to mislead the learning process of the seller.
For instance, Hart and Tirole (1988) argue that a monopolist that sells a perishable unit in each
period and has full commitment power at the beginning of the game nds it optimal to commit
to ignoring all the information that she learns along the equilibrium path about the type of the
buyer. Then, the buyer has no incentives to lie during one period to manipulate the sellers belief.
However, full commitment is a very extreme assumption. In a long-term relationship the seller has
to specify in the contract all potential contigencies during the complete timespan. However, these
contingencies (such as new technologies) could be di¢ cult to foresee. Additionally, the long-term
contract must resist all possible renegotiations due to ex-post ine¢ ciencies that usually arise in
asymmetric information frameworks. For this reason, long-term contracts are very di¢ cult to write
in the real world. In fact, it is possible to nd many situations in which a short-term commitment
relationships ts better.5
There is extensive literature related to bargaining under conditions of asymmetric information
where only one party has the right to make o¤ers. Most of them study the case of durable goods, in
which the game nishes when a buyer accepts an o¤er.6 On the other hand, Hart and Tirole (1988)
and Schmidt (1992) study the case of repeated bargaining where a player with bargaining power
trades a service or perishable good in every period with non-anonymous and su¢ ciently patient
agents.7 All these previous articles restrict the monopolists strategy to a sequence of posted prices.
Nothing guarantees that this mechanism is the optimal one. It is natural to ask if the monopolist
has a better selling mechanism to maximize her benets.
The purpose of this paper is to study the conditions under which price posting may be an optimal
selling mechanism. We also show that it is possible to rationalize the mechanism used by Goethe.
Although Moldovanu and Tieztel (1998) shows that Goethes mechanism is optimal in an static
framework, the description of the story ts better with our dynamic framework. In our framework,
Goethes mechanism is almost optimal if one assumes that the publisher is relatively impatient with
respect to Goethe. This seems a reasonable assumption since publishers could not count on dealing
with Goethe in the future with any type of certainty.
We consider the case in which a seller commits to use a selling mechanism for the current period,
but not for future ones. We study this problem in a two-period model with one seller and one buyer.
The buyer has two possible valuations for the good which are his private information. In every period
the seller has one perishable good to sell, which is produced at zero cost. The seller can propose a
di¤erent selling mechanism in every period.
Skreta (2006) has shown that posting a price is the optimal selling mechanism when a monopolist
with a short-term commitment has a durable good to sell to a single buyer that the monopolist ad-
dresses repeatedly. In this paper, we look for the optimal selling mechanism when such a monopolist
sells instead a perishable good or a service as studied by Hart and Tirole (1988) (in their renting
framework) and by Schmidt (1992). Technically, there is a crucial di¤erence. In Skreta (2006), the
5For some real world examples about the inability of the principal to commit see La¤ont and Tirole (1988), La¤ont
and Tirole (1993) or McAfee and Vincent (1997).
6See for example Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985), or Sobel and Takahashi (1983).
7Hart and Tirole study both cases: the durable good case and the case in which the monopolist decides to rent it.
Chapter 1 9
game nishes when the buyer buys the good, but this is not the case in our model. Her procedure is
not directly applicable to our framework because she sustains her analysis on the fact that the only
non-trivial continuation value arises when the good is not sold. In our model, the buyer has to take
into account how his future surplus is going to be a¤ected in case of buying and in case of rejecting
the good, i.e. there are two continuation values.
To resolve the model, we use a dynamic mechanism design approach following the procedure
proposed in Bester and Strausz (2001). In that article, they provide a modied version of the
revelation principle where the seller has imperfect commitment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general setup of the problem
and review the Bester and Strausz (2001) revelation principle for this type of environment. Section
3 analyzes the problem and gives a characterization of the optimal selling mechanism. Section 4
illustrates, by example, that this result does not hold when players have di¤erent discount factors,
and shows that the mechanism proposed by Goethe can be interpreted in this direction. Finally,
Section 5 concludes. Those proofs considered relevant for the general understanding of the model
are included in the main text while the rest can be found in the Appendix.
1.2 General Setup
Next, we propose a dynamic problem that follows the framework proposed by Bester and Strausz
(2001). The problem is solved by recursive methods as they suggest. Therefore, in this section we
directly propose a dynamic problem as a sequence of static problems. We show in the Appendix how
our recursive formulation corresponds to the sequential two-period problem.
We consider a two-period game with r = f1; 2g, where r is the number of periods remaining at the
beginning of the current period. There is one risk-neutral seller (the principal) and one risk-neutral
buyer (the agent) facing each other repeatedly. Both players discount the future at the same rate
 2 (0; 1]. At every period, the seller can produce at zero cost a non-storable object that is put up
for sale to the buyer.8 This buyer has valuation i for the good, where i 2  = fL; Hg. We call
L (H) the low-type buyer (high-type buyer) and sometimes we denote it by the subscript L (H).
This valuation remains constant over time and is the buyers private information. The probability
of a high-type buyer is denoted by pH;3, and for a low-type buyer by pL;3 = 1   pH;3. We refer to
this as the prior of the seller.
A mechanism  r in period r species a message set Mr and a decision function yr = (xr; wr),
where xr : Mr ! [0; 1] is the allocation rule and wr : Mr ! R is the payment rule. Then, each
element mr 2 Mr commits the seller to implement the allocation rule xr(mr) and requires for the
buyer the payment wr(mr).
The seller has imperfect commitment. This is, during the rst period the seller can commit
herself to a mechanism for the current period but not to a mechanism for the next period. So, at
the beginning of period r = 2 the seller chooses a mechanism  2 2  given her prior pH;3 about
facing a high-type, where  is the space of mechanisms. Next, the buyer observes  2. His strategy
species the probability qi(m2) with which the buyer sends each message m2, where qi :M2 ! [0; 1],
for i 2 fL;Hg and that veriesPm22M2 qi(m2) = 1. The buyer can always choose not to participate
8All our results hold for any constant production cost strictly less than the minimum possible value that the buyer
is willing to pay.
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in the mechanism  2.9 In this case, he gets zero instant payo¤s but he can choose to participate in
the second period. Next, the seller observes m2, implements the mechanism and updates her beliefs
about facing a high-type buyer. We denote it by pH;2(m2) and it is updated following a mapping
pH;2 :M2 ! [0; 1]. In the following, we use pL;2(m2) to indicate 1  pH;2(m2) and p2(m2) to indicate
the vector of posteriors (pL;2(m2); pH;2(m2)) when a message m2 is sent. Updated beliefs constitute
the state variable for the next period. Then, at the beginning of period r = 1 the seller chooses a new
mechanism  1 2  given her updated beliefs, and the buyer observes  1 and chooses his strategy in
response. The seller observes m1, implements the mechanism  1 and the game nishes.
We denote by vr(mr) and ui;r(mr) to the sellers and buyers instant payo¤, respectively, when
the buyer with valuation i sends the message mr, i.e.
vr(mr) = wr(mr);
ui;r(mr) = xr(mr)i   wr(mr):
Let V1 : [0; 1]
2 ! R and Ui;1 : [0; 1]2 ! R represent the continuation values for each player when
r = 2.10
Consequently, given a prior p3  (pL;3; pH;3), the sellers problem at period r = 2 is to choose
(q2; p2; 2) that maximize:11X
i2
X
m22M2
pi;3qi (m2) (v2(m2) + V1 (p2(m2))) ; (1.1)
where q2  (q2 (m2))m22M2 , q2 (m2) indicates the vector (qL(m2); qH(m2)), and p2  (p2 (m2))m22M2 ,
is subject to the following constraints:
 The buyers Incentive Compatibility (ICi;2): the buyer chooses his optimal reporting strategy,
i.e.,
X
m22M2
qi (m2) (ui;2(m2) + Ui;1 (p2 (m2)))  (1.2)X
m22M2
q0i (m2) (ui;2(m2) + Ui;1 (p2 (m2)))
for i 2 fL;Hg ; and for all q0i (m2).
 The buyers Individual Rationality (IRi;2): The buyers individual rationality constraint has
9Note that our denition of the mechanism requires participation. We take the usual convention that the buyer
can decide whether to participate or not, getting zero payo¤s in the last case. This convention is discussed later, when
we talk about the individual rationality constraint (IR). Alternatively, it is possible to include a message in M2 that
represents no participation.
10Continuation values depends on the vector of priors at the beginning of the period. Since there are two types, the
vector of priors is completely determined by the prior about facing a high type, i.e. pH;r+1. Then, later in the paper,
and with some abuse of notation, continuation values will be represented as depending only in that prior.
11 In Bester and Strausz specifaction, it is allowed vi;2(m2) 6= vj;2(m2) when i 6= j givingP
i2
P
m22M2 pi;3qi;2 (m2) (vi;2(m2) + Vi;1(p2)).
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to be satised for all types to which the seller assigns positive probability:
pi;3
" X
m22M2
qi (m2) (ui;2(m2) + Ui;1 (p2 (m2)))   Ui;1
#
 0 (1.3)
for i 2 fL;Hg ; where Ui;1 is the continuation value when the buyer choose not to participate
in the mechanism  2. Although there is no loss of generality in assuming that the buyer
participates with probability one, we have to warranty that he does not do better staying out.
This implies Ui;1  0. We assume Ui;1 = 0 since it is the less restrictive in (1.3) and, as we
will show later, this is the case at the optimal contract (given we can assume any belief for the
out-of-equilibirum message).
 And nally, for each message, the sellers updated belief pi;2 (m2) has to be consistent with
Bayesrule (BR2) whenever possible:
pi;2 (m2)
X
j2
pj;3qj (m2) = pi;3qi (m2) : (1.4)
It follows that the sellers problem with imperfect commitment at r = 2 is given by:
V2(p3) = Maxfq2;p2; 2g
X
i2
X
m22M2
pi;3qi (m2) (v2(m2) + V1 (p2 (m2))) ; (1.5)
subject to (1:2)  (1:4):
We say that the outcome (q2; p2; 2) is incentive feasible if it satises (1.2)-(1.4) for all i 2 .
Additionally, it is incentive e¢ cient if it satises (1.5), the seller chooses the best outcome among all
of the incentive feasible ones. An optimal mechanism is a mechanism  2 that belongs to an incentive
e¢ cient outcome (q2; p2; 2). Finally, (q2; p2; 2) and (q02; p02; 02) are payo¤s equivalent if they leave
the seller and the buyer (of every possible type) with the same payo¤s, i.e.X
i2
X
m22M2
pi;3qi (m2) (v2(m2) + V1 (p2 (m2))) =X
i2
X
m022M 02
pi;3qi
 
m02
  
v2(m
0
2) + V1
 
p02 (m2)

;
X
m22M2
qi (m2) (ui;2(m2) + Ui;1 (p2 (m2))) =X
m022M 02
q0i
 
m02
  
ui;2(m
0
2) + Ui;1
 
p02 (m2)

; i 2 fL;Hg :
1.2.1 Revelation Principle
In this subsection we show that, i) we can restrict to direct mechanisms, ii) that p2 is always
determined by Bayesrule (consequently there are not out-of-equilibrium beliefs) and, iii) that it is
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enough to consider a subset of all possible q2.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism in which the message set is the buyers type set, i.e.,Mr = .
In this case, the buyers strategy is to report each type with some probability, i.e., qi : ! [0; 1], withP
mr2 qi(mr) = 1. Bester and Strausz (2001) provides a revelation principle for environments with
imperfect commitment, including the multistage contracting case as the problem proposed in this
work. Based on this revelation principle we can seek for a solution of (1.5) using direct mechanisms,
i.e.:
Lemma 1 Assume a state pr+1. Any solution (qr; pr; r) for (1.5) is payo¤s equivalent to a solu-
tion

q^r; p^r;  ^r

where  ^r is a direct mechanism and where the buyer reports his type with positive
probability, i.e., q^i(i) > 0 8 i 2 fL;Hg.
Proof. This lemma is a direct application of Proposition 2 and its corollary at Bester and Strausz
(2001).
Bester and Strausz (2001) shows that it is su¢ cient for the mechanism designer to consider
mechanisms in which the set of messages has equal cardinality to the type space. Moreover, they
show that we can associate each message with a type that plays the message with positive probability.
A consequence is that the mechanism designer can be restricted to outcomes (qr; pr; r) where
the mechanism has  as the message set. Then, as every message that belongs to  is reported
with positive probability, she can always associate a message with the corresponding type. That is,
she asks every type to report the truth with positive probability, i.e., qH > 0 and 1  qL > 0 where
we denote by qH (qL) the probability that a high-type buyer (low-type buyer) sends a high-type
message.
Notice that this revelation principle di¤ers from the standard one (see Myerson 1981) in that
there is no guarantee that the buyer reports his true type with certainty. Even so, truthful reporting
is always an optimal strategy for the buyer and he still plays it with positive probability.
Given some mechanism  r, (1.2) requires that any message which is played with positive proba-
bility must be optimal for the buyer. From the revelation principle either qH = 1 (qL = 0), in which
case (1.2) requires that the high-type (low-type) prefers to report the truth, or qH < 1 (qL > 0) in
which case (1.2) requires indi¤erence between both messages. Hence, in our two period setting, (1.2)
can be simplied to:
ICH;2 : uH;2(h) + UH;1(p2(h))  uH;2(l) + UH;1(p2(l)) with equality if 1  qH > 0;
ICL;2 : uL;2(l) + UL;1(p2(l))  uL;2(h) + UL;1(pr(h)) with equality if qL > 0;
where, from now on, we use h and l to indicate high-type and low-type messages, respectively.12
As every message is sent with positive probability by at least one type, (1.4) is always satised.
As a consequence, the posteriors are completely determined by Bayesrule and p2 is a redundant
variable of optimization.
12Notice that when the buyer is indi¤erent between both messages, he randomizes between them. The seller knows
this but she does not observe which probability the buyer chooses for each message. We assume that she can always
select the best equilibrium between all the possible ones as is usual in mechanism design.
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Additionally, we can concentrate our analysis on those incentive feasible outcomes such that
qH  qL. For those incentive feasible outcomes such that qL > qH , we can simply dene a new
mechanism in which the role of each message is interchanged. We prove this in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 All incentive feasible outcomes (qr; pr; r), where  r is a direct mechanism, such that qL >
qH is payo¤ equivalent to an incentive feasible outcome (q^r; p^r; r), with the same direct mechanism
 r, such that q^H > q^L.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that qH  qL implies pH;2(h)  pH;3  pH;2(l) by Bayesrule.
1.3 Optimal Selling Mechanism
In this section we solve the two-period case of the previous problem using backward induction. We
prove that the optimal selling mechanism in both periods can be implemented by price posting, i.e.,
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
Denition 3 A Price Posting Mechanisms in period r -in what follows price posting- is an indirect
mechanism with two possible messages "take  it" or "leave  it", with allocation and payment rules
according to:
xr(mr) =
(
1 if mr = take  it;
0 if mr = leave  it: ; wr(mr) =
(
zr if mr = take  it;
0 if mr = leave  it:
where zr 2 < is the price asked by the seller.
1.3.1 Period r=1
In the last period, instead of using Bester and Strausz, we can use standard mechanism design (see
for example Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) without loss of generality. The sellers problem at r = 1
is:
Max
fx1;w1g
pH;2v1 (h) + pL;2v1 (l) subject to,
ICH;1: uH;1 (h)  uH;1 (l) ;
ICL;1: uL;1 (l)  uL;1 (h) ;
IRH;1: uH;1 (h)  0;
IRL;1: uL;1 (l)  0:
The set of optimal allocations are,
x1(h) = 1 8 pH;2
x1(l) =
8><>:
0 if pH;2 > LH ;
1 if pH;2 = LH ;
1 if pH;2 < LH ;
Chapter 1 14
where 1 2 [0; 1]. Hence, the set of optimal payments are w1 (h) = H  x1(l) and w1 (l) =
x1(l)L, with  = (H   L).
When the seller is optimistic enough in facing a high-type buyer, she proposes a separation
mechanism: high-type buyer receives the good with certainty and pays his valuation, while a low-
type buyer does not receive the good and pays zero. On the other hand, when the seller is pessimistic
she proposes pooling: every buyer gets the good and payment is equal to the low-type valuation.
The prior equal to LH is the limit between both mechanisms. We denote it with 

1. At this prior,
the seller is indi¤erent between both mechanisms. She can even propose any mechanism with an
allocation for the message l between 0 and 1. However, the seller cannot do better than in the pooling
or separation cases. From now on, and to simplify the notation, we are going to consider 1 = 0.13
Remark 4 The optimal mechanism at r = 1 can be implemented by a price posting.
Proof. The proof consists in showing that there is an indirect mechanism with the properties of
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er that is payo¤ equivalent to our optimal direct mechanism. Because this is
a one period game, it is straightforward. See the Appendix for the details.
1.3.2 Period r=2
From previous results we can deduce the continuation values in period r = 2 for the high-type buyer,
the low-type buyer and the seller, respectively:
UH;1 (pH;2) = Ih0; L
H
 (pH;2) ; (1.6)
UL;1 (pH;2) = 0; 8 pH;2;
V1 (pH;2) = pH;2H

1  UH;1 (pH;2)


+
UH;1 (pH;2)

L: (1.7)
As the continuation values for the low-type are zero for every prior, his payo¤s at r = 2 are only
his instant payo¤, while the payo¤s for the high-type buyer are the sum of the instant payo¤s and
his continuation value at (1.6).
Next, we solve the sellers problem at (1.5) for r = 2 after including in it the simplications
of Section 2.1 To do that we propose in the following lemma a reduced program equivalent to the
sellers problem.
13We could choose any other value for 1 and the main result of the paper will still hold. Bester and Strausz
specication allows the possibility of giving to the seller the option of choosing 1 at period r = 2. Using an example,
it can be shown for r = 2 that the seller prefers 1 = 1 at next period when her prior is lower than
L
H
, and 1 = 0
when her prior is higher than L
H
. Including this action for the seller complicates the model without upsetting our
result.
Chapter 1 15
Lemma 5 The sellers problem at (1.5) for r = 2 is equivalent to the reduced program:
Max
fq2; 2g
X
i=L;H
X
m2=l;h
pi;3qi(m2) [v2(m2) + V1(pH;2(m2))] ; subject to, (1.8)
ICH;2 : uH;2(h) + UH;1 (p2 (h)) = uH;2(l) + UH;1 (p2 (l)) ;
IRL;2 : uL;2(l) + UL;1 (p2 (l)) = 0;
SMC2 : x2(h)  x2(l)  UH;1 (p2(l))

  UH;1 (p2(h))

; with equality if qL > 0;
BR2 : pi;2 (m2) =
pi;3qi (m2)P
k=L;H
pk;3qk(m2)
; m2 = l; h; i = L;H
x2 2 [0; 1] ; qH > 0; qL < 1:
Proof. See the Appendix
The previous lemma proves that (1.5), after simplications of Section 2.1, is equivalent to (1.8).
The intuitive description of the constraints in the latter problem is given as follows, and next we de-
scribe the intuition of the proof. The seller considers a binding incentive compatibility constraint for
the high-type (ICH;2), a binding individual rationality for the low-type (IR

L;2) and a new constraint,
the Sequential Monotonicity Condition for r = 2 (SMC2), which replaces the incentive compatibility
of low-type.
The proof has the following steps. First, the incentive compatibility of the high-type (ICH;2)
jointly with the individual rationality of the low-type (IRL;2) imply that individual rationality of
the high-type (IRH;2) is always satised. Second, notice that the seller can increase the payment
of the low-type buyer and the one of the high-type buyer in the same amount while maintaining
the incentive compatibility of high-type buyer and the individual rationality of low-type buyer. It
is optimal for the seller to increase the payments until the low-type buyers payment extracts all
his surplus, resulting in IRL;2. This payment is the maximum value that the low-type buyer can
pay without retreating from the mechanism. Once the seller xes the low-type buyers payment,
she continues increasing the high-type buyers payment until the high-type buyer is indi¤erent to
reporting the truth or not, i.e., ICH;2. Because the high-type buyer is indi¤erent to both messages,
the requirement that he must tell the truth with positive probability is satised. Finally, assuming
ICH;2 and IR

L;2, the incentive compatibility of the low-type buyer (ICL;2) is equivalent to the SMC2.
This new restriction plays a similar role as the monotonicity condition of the static case, which asks
to allocation to be increasing in the buyer type. In fact, notice that if  = 0, our model collapses
to the static case and the SMC2 to the monotonicity condition. In this dynamic framework, the
SMC2 is more restrictive. It still asks that the current allocation increases in the buyer type. It
also requires that the di¤erence in current allocations must be at least as large as the di¤erence
between the future discounted payo¤s (weighted by ) that the high-type buyer gets by lying and
the payo¤s he gets by telling the truth.
Operating with ICH;2 and IR

L;2 and plugging them into the sellers objective function, the sellers
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problem at (1.8) becomes
Max
fq2;x2g
x2(l)L + H;3 (x2(h)  x2(l)) H + H;3 [UH;1 (pH;2(h))  UH;1 (pH;2(l))] (1.9)
+ 

H;3V1(pH;2 (h)) +
 
1  H;3

V1(pH;2 (l))

;
subject to,
SMC2; BR2; x2 2 [0; 1] ; qH > 0; and qL < 1:
where H;3 = (pH;3qH + pL;3qL) is the total probability of observing a message h.
To solve the game it is useful to introduce the following denition.
Denition 6 A mechanism induces learning when UH;1 (pH;2(l))  UH;1 (pH;2(h)) 6= 0.
When UH;1 (pH;2(l))   UH;1 (pH;2(h)) = 0, at r = 1 either pH;2(h)  pH;2(l)  LH or LH >
pH;2(h)  pH;2(l) from (1.6). From the optimal solution for the last period, in the former case
the seller will propose a price posting equal to H and L in the latter case. Hence, her ex-
pected continuation value is linear on pH;3 and equal to V1 (pH;3).14 On the other hand, when
UH;1 (pH;2(l))  UH;1 (pH;2(h)) 6= 0; it must be that pH;2(h)  LH > pH;2(l) from (1.6) and qH  qL,
giving UH;1 (pH;2(l))   UH;1 (pH;2(h)) = . Therefore, the price posting to be proposed at r = 1
di¤ers depending on the message observed in the rst period: H in case of observing message h and
L in case of l. The interpretation indicates that learning becomes relevant when it induces the seller
to o¤er a di¤erent mechanism in the future for each message today, changing the buyers payo¤s.
To solve the problem, we split it into two subproblems. First, we take q2 as given and we solve
with respect to x2. Second, we solve with respect to q2 using the allocations we obtained in the rst
step.15 So, the rst step problem is given by
Max
fx2g
x2 (l) L + H;3 f[x2 (h)  x2 (l)] Hg+ A; subject to, (1.10)
SMC2 : x2(h)  x2(l)  UH;1 (pH;2(l))

  UH;1 (pH;2(h))

; with equality if qL > 0;
x2 2 [0; 1] ;
where
A = H;3 [UH;1 (pH;2(h))  UH;1 (pH;2(l))] + H;3V1(pH;2 (h)) +
 
1  H;3

V1(pH;2 (l)):
A is a constant that has all those terms in the objective function at (1.10) no depending on x2.
Note that because the sellers payo¤s are increasing in x2(h) and that an increment of x2(h)
relaxes the SMC2, then the optimal x2(h) is 1. On the other hand, to obtain the allocation for
message l, we can di¤erentiate the two situations: when qL = 0 and when qL 6= 0. In the former,
14 In other words, the convex combination of sellers continuation values, H;3V1(pH;2 (h)) +
 
1  H;3

V1(pH;2 (l)) is
equal to V1(pH;3). There are two possible situations when there is no learning: when pH;3 <
L
H
, where the sellers
continuation values are V1(pH;2(h)) = V1(pH;2(l)) = L, which are equal to V1(pH;3) = L; and when pH;3  LH , where
V1(pH;2(h)) = pH;2(h)H and V1(pH;2(l)) = pH;2(l)H , equal to V1(pH;3) = pH;3H .
15We are using the general property Max
fx;yg
f(x; y) =Max
fxg

Max
fyg
f(x; y)

.
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x2(l) depends on H;3 = pH;3qH + (1  pH;3)qL and is given by
x2(l) =
8><>:
0 if H;3 >
L
H
;
2 if H;3 =
L
H
;
 if H;3 <
L
H
;
; (1.11)
with 2 2 [0;] and  = min
n
1; x2(h)  UH;1(pH;2(l)) + UH;1(pH;2(h))
o
. When H;3 =
L
H
, the sellers
payo¤s are constant for any x2(l) 2 [0;]. Then, to simplify the analysis we assume x2(l) = 0 at
H;3 =
L
H
.
When qL 6= 0, the low-type is indi¤erent to both messages and the SMC2 holds with equality,
restricting the value of x2(l), which is now given by
x2(l) = x2(h)  UH;1 (pH;2(l))

+ 
UH;1 (pH;2(h))

: (1.12)
To solve the second subproblem, we di¤erentiate those cases where x2(l) = 0 and where x2(l) 6= 0.
Denition 7 We say that a mechanism has SMC non-binding if x2(l) = 0 and SMC binding if
x2(l) 6= 0.
In both cases, it is possible to have learning or no-learning. Because x2(h) = 1, x2(l) = 0 occurs
only when qL = 0 and H;3  LH from (1.11). On the other hand, x2(l) 6= 0 occurs either when
qL = 0 and H;3 <
L
H
, or when qL 6= 0. In both cases, by (1.11) or (1.12), respectively, x2(l) = 1  
when there is learning and x2(l) = 1 when there is no-learning.
1. SMC binding with no-learning (SMC*+NL)
By no-learning, UH;1 (pH;2(l))   UH;1 (pH;2(h)) = 0. Then, the expected continuation value
for the seller is equal to V1 (pH;3) (see above). By SMC binding, x2(l) 6= 0. From (1.12) and
no-learning it must be that x2(l) = 1. Substituting continuation values and allocations at
(1.10) and after some simplications results in the sellers maximum payo¤s equal to
L + max fpH;3H ; Lg :
The seller is indi¤erent among any pair (qL; qH) such that there is SMC binding with no-
learning. We can assume qL = qH 6= 0 (i.e. pH;2(h) = pH;2(l) = pH;3) without a loss of
generality.
2. SMC binding with learning (SMC*+L)
Now UH;1 (pH;2(l)) UH;1 (pH;2(h)) 6= 0 by learning. Because pH;2(h)  LH > pH;2(l), UH;1 (pH;2(l)) 
UH;1 (pH;2(h)) =  by (1.6) and, V1(pH;2 (h)) = pH;2 (h) H and V1(pH;2 (l)) = L by (1.7).
By SMC binding x2(l) 6= 0; and jointly with learning, x2(l) = 1   . Substituting allocations
and continuation values at (1.10) and after some simplications, the seller chooses (qL; qH) to
maximize
L + H;3pH;2 (h) H :
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According to Bayes rule H;3pH;2 (h) = pH;3qH . Because qH  1, a mechanism with SMC
binding with learning is weakly dominated by a mechanism under case 1 for any prior.
3. SMC non-binding with learning (SMC+L)
Now UH;1 (pH;2(l)) UH;1 (pH;2(h)) =  by learning and x2(l) = 0 by SMC non-binding. The
allocation x2(l) = 0 implies that qL = 0 and H;3  LH , i.e. qH  LHpH;3 . This last requirement
jointly with pH;2(h)  LH > pH;2(l) (by learning) implies pH;3  LH (see Lemma 4 in the
Appendix). From (1.7), V1(pH;2 (h)) = pH;2 (h) H and V1(pH;2 (l)) = L. Therefore, the seller
chooses qH to maximize
H;3H + L;
subject to qL = 0; H;3 
L
H
, pH;2(l) <
L
H
;
getting
pH;3H + L:
when qH = 1.
4. SMC non-binding with no-learning (SMC+NL)
no-learning means UH;1 (pH;2(l))   UH;1 (pH;2(h)) = 0 with expected continuation value for
the seller equals to V1 (pH;3) (see above). SMC non-binding means x2(l) = 0. The necessary
conditions for the optimum of the rst problem implies that qL = 0 and H;3  LH , i.e.
qH  LHpH;3 . Additionally, by no-learning, it must be that pH;2(l)  LH .16 To satisfy previous
requirements it is necessary that pH;3  p (where p = L2H +
L
H
, see Lemma 4 in the
Appendix). By substitution at (1.10) and simplication, we see that the seller chooses qH to
maximize
H;3H + pH;3H ;
subject to qL = 0; H;3 
L
H
, pH;2(l)  L
H
;
getting
pH;3H   L

H + pH;3H ;
with qH =
pH;3H L
pH;3
:
16qL = 0 gives pH;2(h) = 1 by BR2. Then, by non-learning, it must be that pH;2(h)  pH;2(l)  LH .
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Notice that at a prior pH;3 = LH

H+
L+

, the seller is indi¤erent to a mechanism of case
SMC+L and a mechanism of case SMC+NL. From now on, we refer to this prior as 2 and we
assume, without a loss of generality, that when pH;3 = 2 the seller proposes a mechanism of case
SMC+NL. At a prior equal to LH , case SMC*+NL, case SMC*+L and case SMC+L give the same
payo¤s to the seller. We assume without a loss of generality that the seller proposes a mechanism of
case SMC+L at that prior.
The following gure summarizes maximum the sellers payo¤s from each of the previous options
for every prior in those ranges in which they are dened. Case SMC*+L is dominated by case
SMC*+NL (they are coincident when pH;3  LH ). Case SMC*+NL is piecewise linear in p, but the
range with pH;3  LH is dominated by cases SMC+L and SMC+NL. These last cases are also linear
in p. Case SMC+L has a lower slope than case SMC+NL and they cross each other at 2.
Figure 1: Sellers payo¤ under di¤erent priors and mechanisms. In Dot-line case SMC*+NL; in
Small-dash-line case SMC*+L (coincident with case SMC*+NL when pH;3  2); in Dash-line
case SMC+L; in Solid-line case SMC+NL
As in the last period, at r = 2 a prior equal to LH acts as a threshold. Therefore, when pH;3  LH
the seller nds it optimal to implement one of the mechanisms with SMC non-binding and, when
pH;3 < LH , the SMC binding with no-learning. We denote this threshold with 

2. It is straightforward
to check under which prior the seller nds optimal to choose each mechanism. This is stated in next
proposition.
Proposition 8 The optimal selling mechanism veries that:
- if pH;3 < 2, (SMC binding with no-learning) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 1, w2 (h) = L, w2 (l) = L,
and qH = qL 6= 0.
- if pH;3 2 [2; 2), (SMC non-binding with learning) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 0, w2 (h) = H ,
w2 (l) = 0, qH = 1 and qL = 0:
- if pH;3  2, (SMC non-binding with no-learning) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 0, w2 (h) = H ,
w2 (l) = 0, qH =
pH;3H L
pH;3
and qL = 0:
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Proof. Directly from previous analysis. It only remains to get w2 (h) and w2 (l). As these
variables are a mechanic substitution in ICH;2 and IR

L;2, they are relegated to the Appendix.
We now describe the thought behind the results of the proposition. The rst case corresponds
to the case in which the seller is pessimistic, i.e., pH;3 < LH . In this case she always sells at a price
equal to the low-type value. This corresponds to case SMC*+NL. The seller has only one alternative,
mentioned above in SMC*+L, under which the seller sells with probability 1 to a high-type buyer
and with probability 1   to a low-type buyer. Learning means that the optimal mechanism in the
next period after a message h only sells to the high-type buyer and at a price equal this buyers
value, and after a message l sells to both types at a price equal to the low-type value. Thus, learning
reduces the expected payo¤s of the rst period in L and increases the payo¤s of the second period
in pH;3H , and hence it is not optimal.
When the seller is optimistic, i.e., pH;3  LH , a mechanism from case SMC+L or from case
SMC+NL is the optimal one. In both cases the seller o¤ers a mechanism such that, in case of
observing a message h, the optimal mechanism in the next period is to sell only to a high-type buyer
at a price equal to this buyers value. In particular, if pH;3  2 (the seller is extremely optimistic),
she prefers a mechanism from case SMC+NL over a mechanism from case SMC+L. In such a case,
there is no-learning and the optimal mechanism is such that she sells only to the high-type buyer
in the second period no matter the message observed in the rst period.17 Therefore, in the second
period, the buyer always makes zero surplus. On the other hand, when the seller is moderately
optimistic, i.e., pH;3 2
h
L
H
; 2

, the optimal mechanism is with learning. In the next period, the
seller sells only to a high-type buyer at a price equal to this buyers value in the case of observing
h, or sells to both types at a price equal to the low-type value in the case of observing l. The seller
has to pay a bribe to incentive the high-type buyer to reveal his type. This bribe is equal to his
discounted future losses by being discriminated in the second period. Therefore, the buyer makes
zero surplus in the second period in case the of reporting h or positive surplus in case of reporting
l.18 Alternatively, using a mechanism of case SMC*+NL (or SMC*+L), the seller can obtain the
same posteriors (and as consequence the same continuation values) as in case SMC+NL (or SMC+L)
but, since she has to keep both buyer types indi¤erent between messages, she has to ask for a lower
payment in the rst period.
Finally, notice that the seller becomes optimistic very fast when a high-type message is sent in
a mechanism with SMC non-binding, reaching pH;2(h) = 1 in both situations. On the other hand,
the seller slowly becomes pessimistic when she observes a low-type message (this last e¤ect can be
observed more clearly with more periods in the second chapter).
Figure 2 summarizes optimal belief dynamic for each prior.
17The seller picks a qH that "commits" her to sell in the second period to the high-type buyer at a price equal to this
buyers value while asking a high payment in the rst period. This qH is lower than one (assigning positive probability
of lying to a high-type), keeping her optimistic enough in the case of observing a message l.
18To o¤er this bribe, the seller considers that the high-type is going to report the truth with probability of one, i.e.,
she picks qH = 1.
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Figure 2: Optimal belief dynamic under di¤erent priors. Vertical line at the left represents the
prior at r = 2. Vertical line at the right represents the posteriors. Full-line arrow is the belief
dynamic under a message h. Dot-line arrow is the belief dynamic under a message l.
Proposition 1 gave us a characterization of the optimal selling mechanisms for any prior. We
state in the following corollary that these optimal mechanisms, which are direct mechanisms, can
be implemented by price posting. To do so, we propose an alternative outcome (q^2; p^2;  ^2) where
 ^2 is a price posting mechanism. Next, we check for any prior whether this outcome is payo¤
equivalent to the incentive e¢ cient outcome (q2; p2; 2) that solves (1.8) and contains the optimal
selling mechanism characterized in previous propositions. Because the proof is mechanic, we relegate
it to the Appendix.
Corollary 9 The optimal selling mechanism at r = 2 can be implemented by a price posting. In
particular:
1) when pH;3  2, the price is H , the high-type buyer randomizes with probability pH;3H LpH;3 and
low-type buyer never buys,
2) when pH;3 2
h
L
H
; 2

, the price is H   , the high-type buyer always buys and low-type buyer
never buys, and
3) when pH;3 < LH , the price is L, both types always buy.
Proof. See the Appendix
These results reassert that the price posting mechanisms proposed by Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005) are the optimal mechanisms when we are not restricted to take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. When
pH;3 < LH , the optimal mechanism is a price posting with SMC binding with no-learning. The authors
call this mechanism "pooling". They call "separation" to the optimal price posting mechanism (the
SMC non-binding with learning) when pH;3 2
h
L
H
; 2

and "semi-separation" to the optimal price
posting mechanism (SMC non-binding with no-learning) when pH;3  2.
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1.4 Di¤erence in patience
In this section we show that when buyer and seller di¤er in their patience price posting is no longer
optimal.
Suppose that both players have di¤erent discount factors:  for the seller,  for the buyer. When
 =  we are in the case analyzed in previous sections, i.e. price posting is optimal. When  6= ,
we can use the same arguments of previous section to deduce that sellers problem is now
Max
fq2;x2g
x2(l)L + H;3 (x2(h)  x2(l)) H + H;3 [UH;1 (pH;2(h))  UH;1 (pH;2(l))]
+ 

H;3V1(pH;2 (h)) +
 
1  H;3

V1(pH;2 (l))

;
subject to,
SMC2; BR2; x2 2 [0; 1] ; qH > 0; and qL < 1:
Notice that this problem is the same that the one at (1.9) with the only change in the discount
factor that a¤ects sellers continuation values, where  was replaced by .
Using the same procedure than in Section 3, the seller gets the following maximum payo¤s in
each case:
1. SMC binding with no-learning: with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 1, w2 (h) = L, w2 (l) = L, and
qH = qL 6= 0.
L + max fpH;3H ; Lg :
2. SMC binding with learning: with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 1   , w2 (h) = L, w2 (l) = (1   )L,
and qH = 1; qL = 0,
L + (   ) (1  pH;3) L + pH;3H :
3. SMC non-binding with learning: (dened for pH;3  LH ) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 0, w2 (h) =
H   , w2 (l) = 0, and qH = 1; qL = 0,
pH;3H + (   ) pH;3 + L:
4. SMC non-binding with no-learning: (dened for pH;3  p) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 0,
w2 (h) = H , w2 (l) = 0, and qH =
pH;3H L
pH;3
; qL = 0,
pH;3H   L

H + pH;3H :
Figure 3 represents sellers payo¤s under di¤erent mechanisms when  =  (at the left) and for
a generic case of  <  (at the right). In the later, for any di¤erence in the discount factors it is
possible to nd a pH;3 < LH such that price posting is not optimal.
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Figure 3: In Dot-line case SMC*+NL; in Small-dash-line case SMC*+L (coincident with case
SMC*+NL when pH;3  2 in the graph at the left); in Dash-line case SMC+L; in Solid-line
case SMC+NL.
In the following example we illustrate, for a particular prior, how large has to be the di¤erence
between discount factors to have that price posting is not optimal.
Example 10 Di¤erent Discount Factors:
Let consider L = 1, H = 2; a prior pH;3 = 13 and  = 1. Case SMC+L and SMC+NL are not
dened for pH;3 < LH .
Sellers payo¤s using a mechanism from case SMC*+NL are equal to L + L, i.e. V2 = 2:0.
Sellers payo¤s using a mechanism from case SMC*+L are equal to L + (   ) (1  pH;3) L +
pH;3H , i.e. V2 = 1 + (1  )23 + 23 . Choosing the appropriate value for , previous sellers payo¤s
can be larger than L + L.
The next chart shows how sellers payo¤s change with :
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When  = 0:25, a mechanism with SMC*+L (case 2) maximizes sellers payo¤s making V2 = 2:17.
Buyers payo¤s are equal to 1 for the high-type buyer and 0 for the low-type buyer. This mechanism
cannot be implemented by a price posting (see the Appendix).
In previous example we have chosen a particular prior to illustrate our point. In the example
the seller is moderately pessimistic about facing a high-type buyer. This is, she believes that the
probably of facing a high-type buyer is small, but it is still large enough to leave room for nding
optimal to learn when, at the same time, she is relatively more patient than the buyer. Notice
that sellers payo¤s under SMC*+L (case 2) are larger than those under SMC*+NL (case 1) when
pH;3
L(1 pH;3) > . In the example, it occurs when 0:5 > .
1.4.1 Goethes Mechanism
In this subsection we show that our model explains why the mechanism proposed by Goethe (see the
Introduction) may be optimal when price posting is not.
To prove so, we take previous example, we construct a variation of the mechanism à la Goethe
and its equilibrium, and we show that payo¤s of this mechanism are arbitrarily close to payo¤s of
the optimal mechanism in Example 1.
Example 11 Goethes Mechanism:
Publisher valuations are L = 1 or H = 2. Goethe has a prior pH;3 = 13 . Discount factors are
 = 1 for Goethe and  = 0:25 for the publisher.
At last period r = 1, Goethe uses the optimal price posting mechanism described at the beginning
of Section 3.
At r = 2, Goethe proposes to the publisher the following mechanism:
 Goethe sends to a lawyer a sealed envelope with his reservation price R 2 <+. Previously,
Goethe commits with the publisher to the probability with which he will send each possible
value of R.19
 At the same time, the publisher sends to the same lawyer a sealed envelope with his o¤er
m 2 <+.
 If m  R, sale takes place at price R (i.e. x(m) = 1; w(m) = R). If m < R, the good is not
sold (i.e. x(m) = 0; w(m) = 0).
An equilibrium for this mechanism is:
 Goethe commits to send a reservation price R1 = L + " with probability p, and R2 = L with
probability (1  p), where p =  " .
 high-type reports m1 = L + " and low-type reports m2 = L.
19Notice that this is a variation of the mechanism proposed by Goethe described at the Introduction, where he does
not commit to the probability with which he will send each reservation price. We assume this commitment of Goethe
to construct the equilibrium below.
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Publishers payo¤s for messagem1 andm2 (Ui;2(m1) and Ui;2(m2); respectively, where i 2 fL;Hg)
are:
UH;2(m1) = p ( + ") + (1  p);
UH;2(m2) = p + (1  p) ( + ) ;
UL;2(m1) =  p";
UL;2(m2) = 0:
Notice that UH;2(m1) > UH;2(m2) and UL;2(m2) > UL;2(m1) when " > 0. It follows that each type
reports his respective message with probability one revealing their types. High-type buyer gets the
poem no matter the reservation price sent by Goethe and low-type buyer gets it only in case of R2.
Goethes payo¤s are
V2 = pH;3 [pR1 + (1  p)R2 + H ] + (1  pH;3) [(1  p)R2 + L] :
When "! 0, types are almost indi¤erent between messages with UH;2()!  and UL;2()! 0
and Goethe makes V2 ! 2:17. We showed in Example 1 that the optimal mechanism gives V2 = 2:17,
then Goethes Mechanism is optimal in the limit.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper establishes that the optimal selling mechanism when an uniformed seller with imperfect
commitment faces the same consumer in a two periods game is to post a price in each one. This result
holds whenever the di¤erence in discount factors is small. Otherwise price posting is not optimal
and the Goethes Mechanism can be rationalized. The method used to solve this problem relies on
the procedure propose by Bester and Strausz (2001).
In the related literature it is assumed that the seller uses a price posting as the selling mechanism.
In this paper we nd that there is not another mechanism that can be used by the seller to increase her
prots. This is a limitation for the seller. She cannot propose a more complex mechanism -sacricing
payo¤ today in order to learn- to take advantage in the future. We also give some conditions under
which our result does not hold.
This paper can be extended in many directions. The more natural extension is to generalize the
model for more periods. This is the purpose of Chapter 2. Another interesting extension is increasing
the number of types, when the monotone hazard rate property does not necessarily hold anymore.
It can be also analyzed the case with many buyers. Bester and Strausz (2000) shows that a direct
mechanism with truthful reporting is not possible in a multi-buyer case. In the same direction, Evans
and Reiche (2008) proves that the revelation principle fails in the multi-buyer setting but only if at
least two buyers have private information. This last case can be considered to check the robustness
of our result. To study an environment with more than one privately informed buyer we have to
consider another approach.
Chapter 2
Optimal Selling Mechanism in a
Repeated Game under Imperfect
Commitment: The Multi-Period Case
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we proved that, in a two-period game, price posting is optimal when both players
have the same discount factor but not when they are su¢ ciently di¤erent. In this paper, we extend
the model of Chapter 1 to a nite number of periods larger than two when the discount factor is
arbitrarily large and equal for both players.
Intuitively, allowing more than two periods provides a richer environment because the seller can
now engage in a strategy of gradual learning. More formally, continuation values at any moment in
time of a multi-period game may be a non-linear function in the prior for either the buyer or the
seller. Moreover, in a static framework, price posting is an optimal mechanism when value functions
are linear and it is not when they are not linear.1 However, linearity (or piecewise linearity) in the
prior on value functions is not a su¢ cient condition for optimality of price posting in an dynamic
framework as we saw in Chapter 1. Then, it is reasonable to conjecture that price posting might not
be optimal in a multi-period game.
We prove two things. First, the seller cannot do better than posting a price in every period as
the selling mechanism without loss of generality. Second, in general along the equilibrium path the
seller posts a price equal to the minimum buyer willingness to pay, i.e. the maximum competitive
price. Discrimination between types is optimal only when the seller is extremely optimistic about
facing a high-type consumer. In other case, learning, albeit possible, is so costly for the seller that
it is not optimal. When the seller has the possibility of learning, her prots are reduced due to the
strategic behavior of the buyer. We also give a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism
and equilibrium payo¤s for every prior.
As in Coases conjecture, the monopolist cannot use a price above the competitive one to discrim-
1See Chapter 2 in Börgers (mimeo) or Chapter 2 in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
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inate among buyers. Coase (1972) conjectured that a monopolist uses this price from the beginning
when she has a durable good to sell in a nite numbers of periods. A solution to this conjecture
is renting the durable good. This result implicitly assumes that the monopolist cannot track past
buyers decisions. However, in our framework the monopolist cannot commit to ignore the informa-
tion disclosed by the buyer. Our model implies that there is no mechanism that solves the Coases
conjecture as a consequence of this lack of commitment.
This has also implications regarding the ratchet e¤ect. In an arbitrary long game and if a discount
factor is not too small, a privately informed buyer knows that in case of revealing his valuation in
the current period he will not get any information rent thereafter (the ratchet e¤ect). Then, the
seller cannot induce him to reveal his information. Schmidt (1993) shows the presence of the ratchet
e¤ect on a repeated bargaining model, producing much pooling in all the equilibria of the game. In
his work, the buyer (who has the bargaining power in his model) o¤ers a price to a seller. As soon
as a price higher than her production cost is accepted (revealing her type) the buyer will not give
her any additional rents. This is true even if the price o¤ered by the buyer in the current period is
not the optimal one for him. Learning process, when it occurs, is always extreme. In our model,
the seller (who has the bargaining power) can o¤er a more complex selling mechanism than price
posting. For example, the seller can propose a menu of contracts such that if the high-type buyer
buys the good in the current period, he is not completely revealing his valuation. In other words, in
the following period the seller will not be certain about facing a high-type buyer. Therefore, she has
to give him rents again if she wants to continue with her learning process. In contrast with Schmidt
(1993), the seller can now propose mechanisms that allow her to learn gradually. Since we prove that
these mechanisms are suboptimal, the seller cannot break the ratchet e¤ect in equilibrium.
Skreta (2005) shows that her results at Skreta (2006) hold for the multi-period case. As we
menttioned in Chapter 1, she studies a di¤erent framework: she considers the durable good case.
To solve the model we use a dynamic mechanism design approach following the procedure pro-
posed in Bester and Strausz (2001), which provides a modied version of the revelation principle
when there is imperfect commitment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general set up of the problem
and reviews the Bester and Strausz (2001) revelation principle for this kind of environment. Section
3 analyzes the problem with two types for any nite T periods game. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Those proofs considered relevant for the general understanding of the model are included in the main
text while the rest can be found in the Appendix.
2.2 General Setup
Next, we propose a dynamic problem that follows the framework proposed by Bester and Strausz
(2001) which is solved by recursive methods as they suggest. Therefore, in this section we directly
propose a dynamic problem as a sequence of static problems. We show in the Appendix how our
recursive formulation corresponds to the sequential problem.
Lets consider a multi-period game with r = f1; 2; ::::Tg and T < 1, where r is the number
of periods remaining at the beginning of the current period. There is one risk neutral seller (the
principal) and one risk neutral buyer (the agent) facing each other repeatedly. Both players discount
the future at the same rate  2 (0; 1]. At every period, the seller can produce at zero cost a non-
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storable object that puts for sale to the buyer.2 This buyer has valuation i for the good, where
i 2  = fL; Hg. We call L (H) the low-type buyer (high-type buyer) and sometimes we denote
it by the subscript L (H). This valuation remains constant over time and is his private information.
The initial probability of facing a high-type buyer is denoted by pH;T+1, and for a low-type buyer by
pL;T+1 = 1  pH;T+1. We refer to this as the prior of the seller.
A mechanism  r in period r species a message set Mr and a decision function yr = (xr; wr),
where xr : Mr ! [0; 1] is the allocation rule and wr : Mr ! R is the payment rule. Then, each
element mr 2 Mr commits the seller to implement the allocation rule xr(mr) and requires for the
buyer the payment wr(mr).
The seller has imperfect commitment. This is, at every period the seller can commit herself to
a mechanism for the current period but not for future ones. So, at the beginning of period r the
seller chooses a mechanism  r 2  given her prior pH;r+1 about facing a high-type buyer, where
 is the space of mechanisms. Next, the buyer observes  r. His strategy species the probability
qi(mr) with which the agent sends each message mr, where qi :Mr ! [0; 1], for i 2 fL;Hg and that
veries
P
mr2Mr qi(mr) = 1. The buyer can always choose not to participate in the mechanism  r.
3
In this case he gets zero instant payo¤s but he can accept future ones. Next, the seller observes mr
and updates her beliefs about facing a high-type buyer. We denote it by pH;r(mr) and is updated
following a mapping pH;r :Mr ! [0; 1]. Beliefs constitute the state variable for the next period, i.e.,
r   1. In the following, we use pL;r(mr) to indicate 1  pH;r(mr) and pr(mr) to indicate the vector
of posteriors (pL;r(mr); pH;r(mr)) when a message mr is sent.
We denote by vr(mr) and ui;r(mr) to the sellers and buyers instant payo¤, respectively, when
the buyer with valuation i sends the message mr, i.e.
vr(mr) = wr(mr);
ui;r(mr) = xr(mr)i   wr(mr);
Vr 1 : [0; 1]2 ! R and Ui;r 1 : [0; 1]2 ! R represent the continuation values for each player.4
Consequently, given the vector of priors pr+1  (pL;r+1; pH;r+1), the sellers problem at period r
is to choose (qr; pr; r) that maximizes:X
i2
X
mr2Mr
pi;r+1qi (mr) (vr(mr) + Vr 1 (pr(mr))) ; (2.1)
where qr  (qr (mr))mr2Mr (qr (mr) indicates the vector (qL(mr); qH(mr)) ), and pr  (pr (mr))mr2Mr ,
is subject to the following constraints:
2All our results hold for any constant production cost strictly less than the minimum possible willingness to pay of
the buyer.
3Note that our denition of the mechanism requires participation. We take the usual convention that the buyer
can decide whether to participate or not, getting zero payo¤s in the last case. This convention is discussed later, when
we talk about the individual rationality constraint (IR). Alternatively, it is possible to include a message in Mr that
represents no participation.
4Continuation values depends on the vector of priors at the beginning of the period. Since there are two types, the
vector of priors is completely determined by the prior about facing a high-type buyer, i.e. pH;r+1. Then, later in the
paper, and with some abuse of notation, continuation values will be represented as depending only in that prior, which
we will denoted as p. We also will denote p(mr) to its posterior after observing mr.
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 The buyers Incentive Compatibility (ICi;r): the buyer chooses his optimal reporting strategy,
i.e.,
X
mr2Mr
qi (mr) (ui;r(mr) + Ui;r 1 (pr (mr)))  (2.2)X
mr2Mr
q0i (mr) (ui;r(mr) + Ui;r 1 (pr (mr)))
for i 2 fL;Hg ; and for all q0i (mr).
 The buyers Individual Rationality (IRi;r): The buyers individual rationality constraint has
to be satised for all types to which the seller assigns positive probability:
pi;r+1
" X
mr2Mr
qi (mr) (ui;r(mr) + Ui;r 1 (pr (mr)))   Ui;r 1
#
 0 (2.3)
for i 2 fL;Hg ; where Ui;r 1 is the continuation value when the buyer choose not to participate
in the mechanism  r. Although there is no loss of generality in assuming that the buyer
participates with probability one, we have to warranty that he does not do better staying out.
This implies Ui;r 1  0. We assume Ui;1 = 0 since it is the less restrictive in (2.3) and, as we
will show later, this is the case at the optimal contract (given we can assume any belief for the
out-of-equilibirum message).
 And nally, for each message, the sellers updated belief pi;r (mr) has to be consistent with
Bayesrule (BRr) whenever possible:
pi;r (mr)
X
j2
pj;r+1qj (mr) = pi;r+1qi (mr) : (2.4)
It follows that the sellers problem with imperfect commitment is given by:
Vr(pr+1) = Maxfqr;pr; rg
X
i2
X
mr2Mr
pi;r+1qi (mt) (vr(mr) + Vr 1 (pr (mr))) ; (2.5)
subject to (2:2)  (2:4):
We say that the outcome (qr; pr; r) is incentive feasible if it satises (2.2)-(2.4) for all i 2 .
Additionally, it is incentive e¢ cient if it satises (2.5), i.e. the seller chooses the best outcome
among all of the incentive feasible ones. An optimal mechanism is a mechanism  r that belongs to
an incentive e¢ cient outcome (qr; pr; r). Finally, (qr; pr; r) and (q0r; p0r; 0r) are payo¤s equivalent
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if they leave the seller and the buyer (of every possible type) with the same payo¤s, i.e.X
i2
X
mr2Mr
pi;r+1qi (mr) (vr(mr) + Vr 1 (pr (mr))) =X
i2
X
m0r2M 0r
pi;r+1q
0
i
 
m0r
  
vr(m
0
r) + Vr 1
 
p0r
 
m0r

;
X
mr2Mr
qi (mr) (ui;r(mr) + Ui;r 1 (pr (mr))) =X
m0r2M 0r
q0i
 
m0r
  
ui;r(m
0
r) + Ui;r 1
 
p0r
 
m0r

; i 2 fL;Hg :
2.2.1 Revelation Principle
In this subsection we show that, i) we can restrict to direct mechanisms, ii) that pr is always
determined by Bayes rule (consequently there are not out-of-equilibrium beliefs) and, iii) that it
is enough to consider a subset of all possible qr.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism in which the message set is the buyers type set, i.e. Mr = .
In this case, the buyer strategy is to report each type with some probability, i.e., qi :  ! [0; 1],
with
P
mr2 qi(mr) = 1. Bester and Strausz (2001) provides a revelation principle for environments
with imperfect commitment, including the multistage contracting problem studied here. Based on
this revelation principle we can seek a solution of (2.5) using direct mechanisms, i.e.:
Lemma 12 Lets assume a state pr+1. Any solution (qr; pr; r) for (2.5) has payo¤s equivalent to
a solution

q^r; p^r;  ^r

where  ^r is a direct mechanism and where the buyer reports his type with
positive probability, i.e., q^i(i) > 0 8 i 2 fL;Hg.
Proof. This lemma is a direct application of the Proposition 2 and its corollary at Bester and
Strausz (2001).
Bester and Strausz (2001) shows that is su¢ cient for the mechanism designer to consider mech-
anisms in which the set of messages has equal cardinality to the type space. Moreover, they show
that we can associate each message with a type that plays the message with positive probability.
A consequence is that the mechanism designer can be restricted to outcomes (qr; pr; r) where
the mechanism has  as the message set. Then, as every message that belongs to  is reported with
positive probability, she can always associate a message with the corresponding type. That is, she
asks to every type to report the truth with positive probability, i.e., qH > 0 and 1   qL > 0 where
we denote by qH (qL) the probability that a high-type buyer (low-type buyer) sends a high-type
message.
Notice that this revelation principle di¤ers from the standard one (see Myerson 1981) in that
there is no guarantee that the buyer reports his true type with certainty. Even so, truthful reporting
is always an optimal strategy for the buyer and he still plays it with positive probability.
Given some mechanism  r, (2.2) requires that any message which is played with positive probabil-
ity must be optimal for the buyer. From the revelation principle either qH = 1 (qL = 0), in which case
(2.2) requires that high-type buyer (low-type buyer) prefers to report the truth, or qH < 1 (qL > 0)
in which case (2.2) requires indi¤erence between both messages. Hence, (2.2) can be simplied to:
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ICH;r : uH;r(h) + UH;r 1(pr(h))  uH;r(l) + UH;r 1(pr(l)) with equality if 1  qH > 0;
ICL;r : uL;r(l) + UL;r 1(pr(l))  uL;r(h) + UL;r 1(pr(h)) with equality if qL > 0;
where, from now on, we use h and l to indicate high-type and low-type messages, respectively.5
As every message is sent with positive probability by at least one type, (2.4) is always satised.
As a consequence, the posteriors are completely determined by Bayesrule and pr is a redundant
variable of optimization.
Additionally, we can concentrate our analysis on those incentive feasible outcomes such that
qH  qL. For those incentive feasible outcomes such that qL > qH , we can simply dene a new
mechanism in which the role of each message is interchanged.
Lemma 13 All incentive feasible outcomes (qr; pr; r), where  r is a direct mechanism, such that
qL > qH is payo¤ equivalent to an incentive feasible outcome (q^r; p^r; r), with the same direct mech-
anism  r, such that q^H > q^L.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that qH  qL implies pH;r(h)  pH;r+1  pH;r(l) by Bayesrule.
2.3 Optimal Selling Mechanism
2.3.1 Road Map
In this section we solve the sellers problem at (2.5), proving that price posting (see Chapter 1 for
its denition) is the optimal selling mechanism for every period when r > 2.
First, we simplify the problem at (2.5) as in the two-period case (Lemma 3). We show that ICH;r
and IRL;r are binding at the optimum, that IRH;r is redundant and that ICL;r can be replaced by
a new constraint (SMCr) which is more useful in the analysis.
Second, we dene the continuation values when the discount factor is arbitrarily large. Next, we
prove they are well dened (Lemma 4 and Lemma 5) and that they have some particular properties
that are going to be useful to solve the sellers problem (from Lemma 6 to Lemma 9).
Finally, we show that the optimal mechanism follows these continuation values and, at the same
time, that price posting is the optimal selling mechanism (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1).
2.3.2 Analysis
To solve the sellers problem at (2.5), it is useful to simplify it rst. Next lemma establishes the
equivalence between (2.5) after simplications of Section 2.1 and a reduced program.
5Notice that when the buyer is indi¤erent between both messages, he randomizes between them. The seller knows
this but she does not observe which probability the buyer chooses for each message. We assume that she can always
select the best equilibrium between all the possible ones as is usual in mechanism design.
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Lemma 14 At any period r, the sellers problem at (2.5) is equivalent to
Max
fqr; rg
X
i2
X
mr=l;h
pi;r+1qi(mr) [vr (mr) + Vr 1 (pr (mr))] ; subject to, (2.6)
ICH;r : uH;r(h) + UH;r 1 (pr (h)) = uH;r(l) + UH;r 1 (pr (l)) ;
IRL;r : uL;r(l) + UL;r 1 (pr (l)) = 0;
SMCr : xr(h)  xr(l)  

[UH;r 1 (pr(l))  UH;r 1 (pr(h))] ; with equality if qL > 0;
BRr : pi;r (mr) =
pi;r+1qi (mr)P
k=L;H
pk;r+1qk (mr)
; mr = l; h;
xr 2 [0; 1] ; qH > 0; qL < 1; qH  qL:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The interpretation of (2.6) is the same than the one for the reduced program in Chapter 1.
Since we consider the case with only two types, the vector pr (mr) is completely determined by
pH;r (mr). From now on, and when it is not explicitly indicated in a di¤erent way, we refer as p to
the prior of observing a high-type buyer at period r, and p (mr) to its posterior when a message mr
is sent.
One further simplication is to substitute wr(h) and wr(l) into (2.6) using IRL;r and IC

H;r. This
is, we substitute
wr(l) = xr(l)L + UL;r 1 (pr (l)) ;
wr(h) = (xr(h)  xr(l)) H + xr(l)L + UL;r 1 (pr (l)) + UH;r 1 (pr (h))  UH;r 1 (pr (l)) ;
into the sellers problem and we get:
Max
fqr;xrg
Wr (xr; qr; p; p(mr)) subject to, (2.7)
SMCr; BRr;
xr 2 [0; 1] ; qH > 0; qL < 1; qH  qL:
where
Wr (xr; qr; p; p(mr)) = xr(l)L + H (xr(h)  xr(l)) H + UL;r 1 (pr (l)) +
H [UH;r 1 (p(h))  UH;r 1 (p(l))] + HVr 1(p(h)) + (1  H)Vr 1(p(l));
and H is equal to (pqH + (1  p)qL).
Continuation Values
We propose some functions for the seller ~Vr(p) and for the high-type buyer ~Ur(p), dening them
recursively. For low-type buyer, we propose a function which is equal to zero for every p. We show
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later that they correspond with the equilibrium continuation values.
From Chapter 1 let ~Vr(p) and ~Ur(p) equal to Vr(p) and Ur(p) respectively, for periods r = 1 and
r = 2. Also from Chapter 1, we use notation of 1, 2 and 2.6 We denote 1 =
L
H
and 0 = 0.
Then, let:
~Vr(p) 
8>><>>:
p   r qr(p)p

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)

+ (1  qr (p) p)  ~Vr 1 ( r 1)
p 2 [r ;  r) qr (p)p

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)

+ (1  qr (p)p)  ~Vr 1
 
r 1
  pqr (p)r 1
p 2 [0; r) L +  ~Vr 1 (p)
;
for all r > 2;
~Ur(p) 
8><>:
p   r (1  qr(p)p)  ~Ur 1 ( r 1)
p 2 [r ;  r) (1  qr (p)p)  ~Ur 1
 
r 1

+ r 1
p 2 [0; r) L +  ~Ur 1 (p)
;
for all r > 2; where,
-  r is the value of p 2 ( r 1; 1) such that rst two lines of ~Vr(p) coincides and r is the value of
p 2  r 1; 1 such that last two lines of of ~Vr(p) coincides.7
- qr (p; qL)  p r 1p(1 r 1)+
(1 p)qLr 1
p(1 r 1) 8p 2 ( r 1; 1), i.e., suppose a low-type buyer is sending a message
h with probability qL, then qr (p; qL) is the probability that a high-type buyer sends a message
h such that the sellers posterior, when she observes a message l, is equal to  r 1.
- qr (p)  p r 1p(1 r 1) 8p 2 ( r 1; 1), i.e., the previous probability for the particular case of a low-type
buyer sending a message h with zero probability (qL = 0).
- qr (p)  p 

r 1
p(1 r 1)
8p 2  r 1; 1, for r > 2 and q2(2) = 1:
Next gure illustrates sellers value functions, as we shall show later. Intervals p 2
h
0; LH
i
;
p 2 [r ;  r] and p 2 [ r; 1] are linear in p. The interval p 2
h
L
H
; r
i
is piecewise linear in p. The
gure also illustrates cuto¤s r and  r. These points guarantee that ~Vr(p) is continuous.
6Recall 1 =
L
H
, 2 =
L
H
and 2 =
L[H+]
H [L+]
.
7This is, r is the value of p 2 (r 1; 1) such that
qr(p)p

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)

+ (1  qr (p) p)  ~Vr 1 (r 1) =
qr (p)p

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)

+ (1  qr (p)p)  ~Vr 1 (r 1)  pqr (p)r 1;
and r is the value of p 2 (r 1; 1) such that
qr (p)p

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)

+ (1  qr (p)p)  ~Vr 1 (r 1)  pqr (p)r 1 = L +  ~Vr 1 (p) :
Then, points r and r guarantee continuity of ~Vr(p) on p.
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Figure 1: Solid-Line: rst line in denition of ~Vr(p); Dash-Line: second line in denition of ~Vr(p);
Dot-Line: third line in denition of ~Vr(p).
Previous denition of ~Vr(p) requires, to be complete, that r and  r exist and are unique. The
following two lemmas prove these properties.
Lemma 15 r =
L
H
Pr 2
i=0


H
i
and veries r =
L
Hqr (r)
8r > 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 16 Solution  r exists and it is unique.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that r and  r are increasing in r.
Next, we propose a functional form for our conjecture of the continuation values. The proof is
by induction.
Lemma 17 ~Ur(p) and ~Vr(p) verify:
~Ur(p) = 
 P
i2
r(p)
i + I[0;r)(p)
r 1
!
;
~Vr(p) = L
P
i2
r(p)
i + pH
P
i2
r(p)
q^r i(p)i + LI[0;r)(p)
r 1 + pHI[r;1](p)
r 1;
where
q^r i(p) 
(
qr i(p) if p   r
qr i(p) o:w:
;

r(p) 

i 2 f0; 1; :::; r   2g : p 2 0; r i	 ;

r(p)  fi 2 f0; 1; :::; r   2g n
r(p)g :
Proof. See the Appendix.
As we will show, the set 
r(p) is the set of periods up to r = 2 in which the seller sells with
probability one no matter the message observed. Its complementary 
r(p) is when this does not
happen. In particular, 
r(p) is the set of periods in which the seller only sells to the high-type buyer
with probability q^r i(p).
The next lemma ensures that  r > r .
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Lemma 18 If  is su¢ ciently closed to 1, then r 2 ( r 2;  r 1) 8r > 2:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Besides,
Lemma 19 Suppose Ur 1(p) = ~Ur 1(p) and Vr 1(p) = ~Vr 1(p). If  2 ((T ); 1), then either

r 1(p (h)) = 
r 1(p (l)) or 
r 1(p (h)) = 
r 1(p (l))nmax fi 2 
r 1(p (l))g, where  (T ) is the
unique solution in (0; 1) to T 2 (1 + ) = 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 8 follows from the facts that r is increasing in r and that  is arbitrarily large. The
former implies that 
r(p) is decreasing in p and 
r 1(p (l))  
r 1(p (h)) since p (h)  p (l). The
latter implies 
r 1(p (h)) = 
r 1(p (l)) or 
r 1(p (h)) = 
r 1(p (l))nmax fi 2 
r 1(p (l))g in order
to verify the SMC.
As in Chapter 1, we say that a mechanism induces learning when the buyers continuation values
are di¤erent for each message. Learning becomes relevant when it induces the seller to propose
in the future a di¤erent mechanism for each message observed in the current period. This implies
that buyers payo¤s are di¤erent for each message. Notice that this denition is with respect to our
conjecture on continuation values.
Denition 20 A mechanism at period r induces learning when ~Ur 1 (p(l))  ~Ur 1 (p(h)) 6= 0.
Notice that, since p (h)  p (l) and ~Ur(p) is decreasing in p by denition, learning means
~Ur 1 (p(l)) > ~Ur 1 (p(h)). We distinguish the following cases of learning and no-learning that cor-
respond with Lemma 8:
Lemma 21 Learning can arise in the following cases:
- Learning-a: if 
r 1(p (l)) = 
r 1(p (h)), p (h)   r 1 and p (l) 2

r 1;  r 1

.
- Learning-b: if 
r 1(p (h)) = 
r 1(p (l))nmax fi 2 
r 1(p (l))g and 
r 1(p) = 
r 1(p (h)).
- Learning-c: if 
r 1(p (h)) = 
r 1(p (l))nmax fi 2 
r 1(p (l))g and 
r 1(p) = 
r 1(p (l)).
Besides, if there is no-learning, then 
r 1(p (l)) = 
r 1(p (h)).
Proof. See the Appendix
By application of Lemma 6 and Lemma 9 we have the following remark.
Remark 22 In learning-a ~Ur 1 (p(h)) = 0 and ~Ur 1 (p(l)) = r 2. In learning-b and learning-c,
~Ur 1 (p(l))  ~Ur 1 (p(h)) = j where j = max fi 2 
r 1(p (l))g.
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Optimality
Next, we solve the problem at (2.7) using our conjecture of continuation values and we show that
the optimal solution follows that conjecture. At the same time, we prove that the optimal selling
mechanism is price posting.
Then, the sellers problem is
Max
fqr;xrg
~Wr (xr; qr; p; p(mr)) subject to, (2.8)
SMCr; BRr;
xr 2 [0; 1] ; qH > 0; qL < 1; qH > qL:
where
~Wr (xr; qr; p; p(mr)) = xr(l)L + H (xr(h)  xr(l)) H + H
h
~Ur 1 (p(h))  ~Ur 1 (p(l))
i
+
+H ~Vr 1(p(h)) + (1  H) ~Vr 1(p(l));
and H is equal to (pqH + (1  p)qL).
As we did in Chapter 1, we split (2.8) into two subproblems. We consider the two variables
maximization problem as a maximization problem in which the seller chooses rst qr and next xr.8
This is, xing qr, we maximize with respect to xr. Since sellers payo¤ are increasing in xr(h) and the
increment of xr(h) relaxes the SMCr, then the optimal xr(h) is 1. On the other hand, the optimal
allocation for message l depends on H = pqH + (1  p)qL, i.e. xr(l) = x^r(l; qr) where
x^r(l; qr) =
(
0 if H  LH
 if H <
L
H
; (2.9)
with  = min
n
1; 1   ~Ur 1(p(l)) + 
~Ur 1(p(h))

o
when qL = 0,9 and
x^r(l; qr) = 1  
~Ur 1 (p (l))

+ 
~Ur 1 (p (h))

(2.10)
when qL 6= 0.
8We are using the general property Max
fx;yg
f(x; y) =Max
fxg

Max
fyg
f(x; y)

.
9The optimal allocation for next period is
x^r 1(l; qr 1) =
8><>:
0 if H;r 1 >
L
H
r 1 if H;r 1 =
L
H
 if H;r 1 <
L
H
with r 1 2 [0;] : Bester and Strausz specication allows the possibility of giving to the seller the option, at period r,
of choosing r 1. Incluiding this action for the seller complicates the model without upsetting our result. We assume
r 1 = 0. Given this assumption, we can also assume without loss of generality that x^r(l; qr) = 0 when H =
L
H
at
period r.
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Now, we have to solve the sellers maximization problem with respect to qr, i.e.
max
fqrg
~Wr (x^r(l; qr); qr; p; p(mr)) ; subject to, (2.11)
p(h) =
pqH
pqH + (1  p)qL ;
p(l) =
p(1  qH)
p(1  qH) + (1  p)(1  qL) ;
qH 2 (0; 1] ; qL 2 [0; 1) ; qH > qL:
To solve the second subproblem, we di¤erentiate those cases where xr(l) = 0 and where xr(l) 6= 0.
Denition 23 We say that a mechanism has SMC non-binding if xr(l) = 0 and SMC binding if
xr(l) 6= 0.
In both cases, it is possible to have learning or no-learning. Since xr(h) = 1 and  is arbitrarily
large, is not possible to have xr(l) = 0 at (2.10). It follows that the allocation xr(l) = 0 occurs only
when qL = 0 and H  LH from (2.9). On the other hand, xr(l) 6= 0 occurs either when qL = 0 and
H <
L
H
, or when qL 6= 0. In both cases, by (2.9) or (2.10), respectively, xr(l) = 1  r 1 when there
is learning-a, xr(l) = 1   j+1 when there is learning-b or learning-c, and xr(l) = 1 when there is
no-learning.
We can use previous terminology to distinguish eight subcases: SMC non-binding with no-learning
(SMC+NL), SMC non-binding with learning (SMC+L) of cases a, b and c (SMC+La, SMC+Lb and
SMC+Lc), SMC binding with no-learning (SMC*+NL), and SMC binding with learning (SMC*+L)
of cases a, b and c (SMC*+La, SMC*+Lb and SMC*+Lc). Some of them could be empty for
some prior. To analyze each subcase we assume that continuation values have the functional form
proposed at Lemma 6. Next, we prove that the optimal mechanisms give payo¤s that indeed follows
our proposal. We also characterized the optimal mechanism for any prior. This is stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 24 For any r > 2 and for any  2 ((T ); 1) ; the continuation payo¤s associated to the
optimal selling mechanism are such that Ur(p) = ~Ur(p) and Vr(p) = ~Vr(p). The optimal selling
mechanism is characterized by:
- if p   r, (SMC non-binding with no-learning) satises that xr(h) = 1, xr(l) = 0, wr(h) = H ;
wr(l) = 0, qH = qr (p), and qL = 0.
- if p 2 [r ;  r), (SMC non-binding with learning) satises that xr(h) = 1, xr(l) = 0, wr(h) =
H   r 1; wr(l) = 0, qH = qr (p), and qL = 0.
- if p 2 [0; r), (SMC binding with no-learning) satises that xr(h) = xr(l) = 1, wr(h) = wr(l) = L,
qH = qL 6= 0.
Proof. We start by assuming that continuation values for period r   1 are ~Ur 1(p) and ~Vr 1(p)
for high-type buyer and for the seller respectively. We assume zero continuation value for low-type
buyer.
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We proceed as follow. First, in each of the following claims we get payo¤s for the optimal
mechanism in each subcase, indicating under which priors the subcase is not empty. These payo¤s
are either linear or piecewise linear in p. Second, we show that SMC+NL and SMC+L give the
same payo¤s at prior p =  r and that the former is steeper than the latter. Third, we show that
SMC*+La, SMC+L and SMC*+NL give the same payo¤s at p = r . By slope comparison, we prove
that SMC*+La is either dominated by SMC+L or by SMC*+NL. Finally, SMC*+Lb and SMC*+Lc
are dominated by SMC*+NL.
Claim 25 Optimization of (2.11) subject to the additional constraint SMC non-binding with no-
learning (SMC+NL) veries that
Ur(p) = 0; (2.12)
Vr(p) = pH
r 2X
i=0
iqr i(p) + r 1pH ;
with qH = qr and qL = 0. Moreover, it is dened for p  p where p =  r 1 + (1   r 1) LH .
Proof of Claim 1. In this case, ~Ur 1 (p(l))   ~Ur 1 (p(h)) = 0 by no-learning and xr(l) = 0
by non-binding. This allocation implies qL = 0 and H  LH from (2.9), requiring qH  LHp .
On the other hand, p (h) = 1 by BRr and, from the functional form of continuation values at
Lemma 6, to have no-learning it must be that p (l)   r 1, requiring qH  qr by denition of
qr. Hence p  p where p =  r 1 + (1    r 1) LH . Since p (l)   r 1 then p (l) > r 1 and

r 1(p (h)) = 
r 1(p (l)) = ;. Using previous information, we can get agents continuation values
after substituting it in their functional form at Lemma 6. Plugging them into (2.11) and after
some simplications, the seller maximizes her payo¤s with qH = qr (the maximum qH such that
p (l) =  r 1), getting (2.12).
Claim 26 Optimization of (2.11) subject to the additional constraint SMC non-binding with learning
(SMC+L) veries that
Ur(p) = 0; (2.13)
Vr(p) = pH
r 2X
i=0
iqr i(p) + 
r 1L;
with qH = qr and qL = 0. Moreover, it is dened for p  r and only learning-a is feasible.
Proof of Claim 2. In this case, ~Ur 1 (p(l))   ~Ur 1 (p(h)) > 0 by learning and xr(l) = 0 by
non-binding. This implies qL = 0 and H  LH from (2.9), requiring qH  LHp . By BRr, p (h) = 1
(i.e. p (h) >  r 1). Learning-a is the only learning case which is feasible with p (h) >  r 1, i.e.

r 1(p (h)) = 
r 1(p (l) = ; and p (l) 2

r 1;  r 1

. Then, qH  qr by denition of qr , and jointly
with qH  LHp , implies that p must be larger or equal to r 1 + (1   r 1) LH which it turns to be
equal to r by Lemma 4. After substituting previous conditions in the functional form of continuation
values at Lemma 6, plugging them into (2.11) and after some simplications, the seller maximizes
her payo¤s with qH = qr (the maximum qH such that p (l) = r 1), getting (2.13).
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Claim 27 Optimization of (2.11) subject to the additional constraint SMC binding with no-learning
(SMC*+NL) veries that
Ur(p) =  +  ~Ur 1(p); (2.14)
Vr(p) = L +  ~Vr 1(p);
with qH = qL 6= 0.
Proof of Claim 3. In this case, ~Ur 1 (p(l))   ~Ur 1 (p(h)) = 0 and 
r 1(p (l)) = 
r 1(p (h))
by no-learning. Also, binding with no-learning means xr(l) = 1 either by (2.9) when qL = 0 and
H <
L
H
or by (2.10) when qL 6= 0.
Since 
r 1(p (l)) = 
r 1(p (h)); operating with the denition of sellers continuation values, we
get that H ~Vr 1(p (h)) + (1  H) ~Vr 1(p (l)) is equal to ~Vr 1(p).10 Hence, substituting previous
conditions into (2.11) and after some simplication, we get that payo¤s are equal to (2.14). The
seller can choose any qH and qL subject to SMC*+NL. In particular, let qH = qL 6= 0 which give
~Vr 1(p (h)) = ~Vr 1(p (l)) = ~Vr 1(p).
Claim 28 Optimization of (2.11) subject to the additional constraint SMC binding with learning-a
(SMC*+La) veries that the sellers expected payo¤s are bounded above by
L +
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1L + pqHH
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1qr 1 i(p (h))
+ p (1  qH) H
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1qr 1 i(p (l)) + 
r 1pqHH ;
and bounded below by
L +
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1L + pqHH
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1qr 1 i(p (h))
+ p (1  qH) H
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1qr i 1(p (l)) + r 1pqHH :
for the optimal qH such that p (h)   r 1 and p (l) 2

r 1;  r 1

. This mechanism is dened for
p  r 1. Moreover, when p = r sellers expected payo¤s are equal to (2.14) with qH = qr (r) and
qL = 0.
Proof of Claim 4. Now ~Ur 1 (p(l))   ~Ur 1 (p(h)) 6= 0 by learning and xr(l) 6= 0 by binding.
As consequence x^r(l; qr) < 1 from (2.9) when qL = 0 and H <
L
H
or, from (2.10) when qL 6= 0.
Since we are considering learning-a, 
r 1(p (l)) = 
r 1(p (h)), p (h)   r 1 and p (l) 2

r 1;  r 1

,
giving ~Ur 1 (p(h)) = 0 and ~Ur 1 (p(l)) = r 2, i.e. xr(l) = 1  r 1.
By denition, p (h)   r 1 and p (l) 2

r 1;  r 1

implies that q^r 1 i(p(h)) is equal to qr 1 i (p (h))
10No-learning implies that q^r 1 i(p(h)) and q^r 1 i(p(l)) are either equal to qr 1 i(p(h)) and to qr 1 i(p(l)) respec-
tively, or equal to qr 1 i(p(h)) and to q

r 1 i(p(l)). Then,
Hp (h) q^r 1 i(p (h)) + (1  H)p (l) q^r 1 i(p (l)) = pq^r 1 i(p):
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and q^r 1 i(p(l)) to qr 1 i (p (l)). From 
r 1 (p (l)) = 
r 1 (p (h)) it follows 
r 1 (p (l)) = 
r 1 (p (h))
and 
r 1 (p) = 
r 1 (p (h)). We can get continuation values form Lemma 6, and after substituting
them at (2.11) and some simplications, the seller has to choose (qH ; qL) to maximize,
L +
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1L + pqHH
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1qr 1 i(p (h)) (2.15)
+ p (1  qH) H
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1qr 1 i(p (l)) + 
r 1pqHH ;
subject to p (h)   r 1 , p (l) 2

r 1;  r 1

.
Notice that, since p (h)  p  p (l), this mechanism can only be dened for p  r 1, which implies

r 1(p) = ;.
Since qr() < qr () by denition, (2.15) is bounded above when replacing qr 1 i(p (h)) by qr 1 i(p (h)).11
On the other hand, (2.15) is bounded below when replacing qr i 1(p (l)) with qr i 1(p (l)).
Moreover, when p = r , the seller maximizes (2.15) choosing qH = qr (r) (in order to p (l) =
r 1), and qL = 0 (to get p (h) = 1 while H <
L
H
) making
L + L
X
i2
r 1(r)
i+1 + r (1  qr (r)) H
X
i2
r 1(r)
i+1
r 1   r 2 i
r 1
 
1  r 2 i
 + r 1L.
Using the relation of r with r 1 implicit in Lemma 4 we get that
L + 

r (1  qr (r)) H
r 1   r 2 i
r 1
 
1  r 2 i
 = rHqr 1 i(r):
Then, sellers maximum payo¤s can be written as
L + 

rH
X
i2
r 1(r)
i+1qr 1 i(

r) + 
r 1L:
This last expression is equivalent to sellers payo¤ at (2.14) when we replace in it the functional form
of ~Vr 1(r) from Lemma 6. By the denition of ~Vr(p), it is also equal to (2.13) for p = r .
Claim 29 Optimization of (2.11) subject to the additional constraint SMC binding with learning-b
(SMC*+Lb) veries that the seller expected payo¤s are equal to (2.14) with (qH ; qL) such that qH is
equal to
p r j 2
p(1 r j 2) +
(1 p)qLr j 2
p(1 r j 2) , where j = max fi 2 
r 1(p (l))g. This mechanism is dened for
p <  r 1.
Proof of Claim 5. ~Ur 1 (p(l))   ~Ur 1 (p(h)) 6= 0 by learning and xr(l) 6= 0 by binding. As
11To simplify (2.15) we use
H;p (h) q^r 1 i (p (h)) + (1  H)p (l) q^r 1 i (p (l)) =
= pqH q^r 1 i(p (h)) + p (1  qH) q^r 1 i(p (l))
= pq^r 1 i(p);
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consequence x^r(l; qr) < 1 from (2.9) when qL = 0 and H <
L
H
or, from (2.10) when qL 6= 0. Since we
are considering learning-b, j
r 1(p (l))j   j
r 1(p (h))j = 1 and 
r 1(p) = 
r 1(p (h)), with p (h) <
 r 1 and p (l) <  r 1, giving ~Ur 1 (p(l))  ~Ur 1 (p(h)) = j where j = max fi 2 
r 1(p (l))g, i.e.
xr(l) = 1  j+1.
Since  r 1 > p (h)  p (l) and p (h)  p  p (l), this mechanism is dened for p <  r 1. Additionally,
 r 1 > p (h)  p (l) implies q^r 1 i(p()) = qr 1 i (p ()) by denition. Let j to be the larger
i 2 
r 1 (p (l)) ; i.e.
r 1 (p (l)) = f0; 1; :::; jg and 
r 1 (p (l)) = fj + 1; :::; r   3g. By denition
of 
r 1 (p (l)), it must be that p (l) 2
h
r 2 j ; 

r 1 j

, and since j
r 1 (p (l))j = j
r 1 (p (h))j+ 1,
p (h) 2
h
r 1 j ; 

r j

with 
r 1 (p (h)) = f0; 1; :::; j   1g and 
r 1 (p (h)) = fj; j + 1; :::; r   3g.
Continuation values for r 1 are given by Lemma 6. Substituting continuation values and allocations
at (2.11) and after some simplications,12 the seller chooses (qH ; qL) to maximize
L +
X
i2
r 1(p(h))
L
i+1 + j+1
 
pqH  
(1  p)qLr j 2
1  r j 2
!
H +
+ pH
X
i2
r 1(p(h))nfjg
qr 1 i (p) 
i+1 + L
r 1
subject to p (h) 2 r 1 j ; r j ; p (l) 2 r 2 j ; r 1 j :
These payo¤s are maximized with qH equal to
p r j 2
p(1 r j 2) +
(1 p)qLr j 2
p(1 r j 2) (which is the maximum qH
such that p (l) 2
h
r 2 j ; 

r 1 j

, i.e. p (l) = r 2 j), making
L + L
X
i2
r 1(p)
i+1 + pH
X
i2
r 1(p)
qr 1 i (p) 
i+1 + L
r 1:
These payo¤s are equal to the expression at (2.14) when we replace ~Vr 1(p) by its functional form
dened for p <  r at Lemma 6.
Claim 30 Optimization of (2.11) subject to the additional constraint SMC binding with learning-c
(SMC*+Lb) veries that the seller expected payo¤s are equal to
L + L
X
i2
r 1(p)nfjg
i+1 + pH
X
i2
r 1(p)[fjg
qr 1 i (p) 
i+1 + L
r 1; (2.16)
with (qH ; qL) such that qH is equal to
p r j 2
p(1 r j 2) +
(1 p)qLr j 2
p(1 r j 2) , where j = fmax i 2 
r 1(p (l))g.
This mechanism is dened for p <  r 1.
Proof of Claim 6. ~Ur 1 (p(l))   ~Ur 1 (p(h)) 6= 0 by learning and xr(l) 6= 0 by binding. As
consequence x^r(l; qr) < 1 from (2.9) when qL = 0 and H <
L
H
or, from (2.10) when qL 6= 0. Since we
12Notice that
H;p (h) q

r j 1 (p (h)) = pqH  
(1  p)qLr j 2
1  r j 2
:
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are considering learning-c, j
r 1(p (l))j   j
r 1(p (h))j = 1 and 
r 1(p) = 
r 1(p (l)), with p (h) <
 r 1 and p (l) <  r 1, giving ~Ur 1 (p(l))  ~Ur 1 (p(h)) = j where j = max fi 2 
r 1(p (l))g, i.e.
xr(l) = 1  j+1:
Since  r 1 > p (h)  p (l) and p (h)  p  p (l), this mechanism is dened for p <  r 1.
Let j to be the larger i 2 
r 1 (p (l)). By denition of 
r(p), p (l) 2
h
r 2 j ; 

r 1 j

and, since

r 1(p) = 
r 1 (p (l)), also p 2
h
r 2 j ; 

r 1 j

. Following the same procedure than in previous
point, sellers maximum payo¤s are equal to (2.16).
We have the optimal mechanisms for each subcase. We proceed now to compare them. Notice
that (2.12) and (2.13) are linear on p and, that (2.14), payo¤s at Claim 4 and (2.16) are piecewise
linear in p with slopes increasing in p.13
Notice that (2.12) is the functional form at Lemma 6 dened for p   r and (2.13) the one for
p <  r, i.e. Vr(p) = ~Vr(p) and Ur(p) = ~Ur(p). Then, they follow our denition of ~Vr(p) and ~Ur(p)
for p   r and p 2 [r ;  r) respectively. By this denition, they are equal at p =  r. Finally, (2.12)
is steeper than (2.13) due to 11 r 1 i  11 r 1 i . Then, (2.12) dominates (2.13) when p   r and
the opposite when p <  r.
Figure 2: Maximum Sellers payo¤s. Dash-Line: SMC non-binding with learning; Solid-Line: SMC
non-binding with no-learning.
Payo¤s at (2.14) have the functional form at Lemma 6 dened for p < r , i.e. Vr(p) = ~Vr(p) and
Ur(p) = ~Ur(p). Then by the denition of ~Vr(p) and ~Ur(p), (2.14) and (2.13) are equal at p = r .
From Claim 4, (2.14) and (2.13) are also equal to sellers payo¤s under SMC binding with learning-a
at p = r .
When p 2  r 1;  r, the slope of (2.14) is bounded above by Pr 2i=1 iH 1(1 r 1 i) which is
lower than the one of (2.13), equal to H 1(1 r 1)
+
Pr 2
i=1 
iH
1
(1 r 1 i)
. When p < r i for i 2
f1; :::; r   2g the slope of (2.14) is decreasing in i.14 Then, the current mechanism dominates the one
13When p 2 r 2 j ; r 1 j, 
r 1(p) = fj + 1; :::; r   3g by denition. Applying functional form for continuation
values at Lemma6, ~Vr 1(p) at (2.14) has slope
Pr 3
i=j+1 
iH
1
1 r 1 i
. On the other hand, when p 2 r 1 j ; r j,
now 
r 1(p) = fj; :::; r   3g, and ~Vr 1(p) has a larger slope equal to jH 11 r 1 j +
Pr 3
i=j+1 
iH
1
1 r 1 i
. The same
argument can be used to check that slopes are increasing in p in payo¤s at Claim 4 and at (2.16).
14When p < 2, the slope of (2.14) is zero.
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under SMC binding with learning when p < r and the opposite when p 2 [r ;  r]. When p >  r, the
slope of (2.14) is now equal to H
Pr 2
i=1 
i 1
(1 r 1 i) + 
r 1H , which is lower than the one of (2.12).
Figure 3: Maximum Sellers payo¤s. Dot-Line: SMC binding with no-learning; Dash-Line: SMC
non-binding with learning.
From Claim 4, the upper bound of sellers payo¤s has a maximum slope equal to
H
r 3X
i=0
i+1
1 
1  r 2 i
 + r 1H ;
when assuming that, in the maximization of (2.11), the seller could choose qH = 1 such that p (h) 
 r 1, p (l) 2

r 1;  r 1

. This slope is lower to the one at (2.13) which is H
Pr 2
i=0 
i 1
(1 r 1 i)
.15
On the other hand, the lower bound of sellers payo¤s has a minimum slope equal to
H
r 3X
i=0
i+1
1
(1   r 2 i) + 
r 1H ;
when assuming that, in the maximization of (2.11), the seller could choose qH = 1 such that
p (h)   r 1 , p (l) 2

r 1;  r 1

. This slope is larger than the one of (2.14) (bounded above by
H
Pr 2
i=1 
i 1
(1 r 1 i)) when p < 

r . Then, when p > 

r , a mechanism SMC binding with learning-a
is dominated by a mechanism SMC non-binding with learning and, when p < r , it is dominated by
SMC binding with no-learning.
15 1
(1 r 1)
+ 
(1 r 2)
+ :::+ 
r 2
(1 1)
> 
(1 r 2)
+ :::+ r 1 due to 1
(1 r 1)
> 1:
v, 
p 
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Figure 4: Maximum Sellers payo¤s. SMC binding with learning-a (Dash-Double Dot-Line)
dominated by SMC binding with no-learning (Dot-Line ) and SMC non-binding with learning (
Dash-Line)
From Claim 5 SMC binding with learning-b gives the same payo¤s than SMC binding with no-
learning. From Claim 6, and SMC binding with learning-c is weakly dominated by SMC binding with
no-learning since payo¤s at (2.16) are lower than payo¤s at (2.14) due to pqr 1 j (p) <
L
H
when
p < r 1 j by Lemma 4.
Figure 5: SMC binding with no-learning coincides with SMC binding with learning-b for p <  r 1.
Figure 6: Dot-Line: SMC binding with no-learning; Dash-Line: SMC binding with learning-c.
Concluding, the optimal mechanism is a SMC non-binding with no-learning when p   r, a SMC
non-binding with learning when p 2 [r ;  r) and a SMC binding with no-learning when p 2 [0; r).
v, 
v, 
····'1 
v, 
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Optimal allocations are
xr(h) = 1, xr(l) =
(
0 if p  r
1 if p < r
:
Optimal payments are obtained by replacing, for each case, allocations and continuation values at
IRL;r and IC

H;r and solving for wr(l) and wr(h),
wr(h) =
8><>:
H if p   r
H   r 1 if p 2 [r ;  r)
L if p < r
; wr(l) =
(
0 if p  r
L if p < r
:
Notice that low type payo¤s are zero with previous wr(l) given that we assumed zero continuation
values for him.
The argument of the proof relies on the following: the optimal payo¤s for each subcase are either
linear or piecewise linear functions of p. The upper envelope of these functions only contains SMC
non-binding with no-learning (when p   r), SMC non-binding with learning-a (p 2 [r ;  r)) and
SMC binding with no-learning (p 2 [0; r)). Then, this upper envelope characterizes the optimal
mechanism for every prior and it is equal to the denition of ~Vr(p). It is summarized in Figure 1.
Optimal mechanisms in Theorem 1 are direct mechanisms with allocation xr(l) 2 f0; 1g. We
state in the following corollary that the optimal direct mechanism can be implemented by a price
posting, which is an indirect mechanism. To do that, we propose an alternative outcome (q^r; p^r;  ^r)
where  ^r is a price posting mechanism and we check that this outcome is payo¤ equivalent to the
incentive e¢ cient outcome (qr; pr; r) that solves (2.6) and contains the optimal selling mechanism
characterized in the theorem. Since the proof is mechanic, we relegate it to the Appendix.
Corollary 31 When r > 2, the optimal selling mechanism can be implemented by a price posting
equal to
i) H when p   r, the high-type buyer randomizes and the low-type buyer never buys;
ii) H   r 1 when p 2 [r ;  r), The high-type buyer always buys and the low-type buyer never
buys and;
iii) L when p < r, both types always buy.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the seller is optimistic (p  r), she o¤ers a price posting that separates types. This
is, only the high-type buyer buys with positive probability. In case of being extremely optimistic
(p   r), the seller o¤ers a price posting equal to H . The high-type buyer randomizes and, in case
of not buying, the seller will ask for a price equal to H in the following period again. Then, she
exploits the buyer extracting all his surplus in every period. This exploiting case corresponds with
SMC non-binding with no-learning. In case of being moderately optimistic (p 2 [r ;  r)), the seller
o¤ers a price posting equal to H   r 1. Now, the seller is bribing the high-type buyer to induce
him to reveal his type. This bribe is equal to his future discounted losses by being discriminated
in the current period. This bribing case corresponds with SMC non-binding with learning. Finally,
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when the seller is pessimistic (p < r), she o¤ers a price equal to L. This is the pooling case, when
both buyer types always buy, which corresponds with SMC binding with no-learning.
Beliefs Dynamic
Figure 7 indicates how beliefs evolve. Starting at an optimistic prior (i.e. p  r), the sellers beliefs
are updated gradually as information is revealed when the buyer does not buy. On the other hand,
when the buyer buys, she quickly learns that she is facing a high-type consumer with certainty.
Starting at p 2
h
L
H
; r

, sellers beliefs are not updated up to some period r   i where p  r i.
When p < LH , sellers beliefs are never updated.
Figure 7: Belief dynamic under di¤erent priors for T>2 periods.. A full line shows how beliefs
evolve when the buyer buys the good. The dash line is when he does not buy.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper generalizes the model of Chapter 1 for many periods when both players have the same
discount factor. It proves that within this framework the optimal selling procedure is to post a price
in every period. The paper also gives a complete characterization of equilibrium payo¤s.
A natural extension is to study which is the optimal mechanism when discount factors are di¤erent
but close to one.
Chapter 3
Labor Mobility and Technology Choice
(joint work with Daniel García-González)
3.1 Introduction
High labor turnover constitutes a common feature in many industries. Workers often climb the job
ladder by moving to new rms who bid up their wages. Indeed, the availability of workers performing
similar tasks in other rms is one of the classical reasons for industry agglomeration. As Marshall
(1890) pointed out "a localized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it o¤ers a constant
market for skill". This is a very important feature of high-skilled sectors like high-tech or consulting.
For instance, software developers in Silicon Valley have very high mobility rates (see Mukherjee
(2008)).
In this "market for experience", poaching rms have an important informational disadvantage
with respect to the initial employer. They make wage o¤ers to prospective workers based on partial
(if any) information regarding their past performance. The current employer will often be more
informed about the workers ability, and may, therefore, prot from such informational advantage.
In particular, if all rms had the same underlying productivity, an extreme form of adverse selection
obtains and all workers would remain with their initial employers.
If, on the other hand, there is heterogeneity among rms, more productive rms may prefer to
hire experienced workers from rival rms.1 Less productive rms may then try to retain their best
workers by concealing information about their skill. For instance by using di¤erent technologies
they may be able to adjust the amount of public information about workers skill. The goal of this
paper is to understand this interaction by embedding a career-concern model into a very simple labor
market framework. In particular, we assume that past performance is perfectly observable but is
only an imperfect signal of workersability. The signal-to-noise ratio depends on the characteristics
of the tasks, which are chosen by the current employer. We show that some rms decide to design
ine¢ ciently the characteristics of the task in order to conceal information from the market, and
decrease the likelihood of losing skilled workers.
1 In our model, we assume that the maximum expected productivity is obtained when the more productive worker
is assigned to the more capitalized rm.
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More precisely, we consider an industry populated by overlapping generations of two-period lived
workers who vary in their skill level. Firms are innitely lived and require one worker per period
to produce output. Firms are also heterogenous, di¤ering in their capital stock (i.e., their marginal
labor productivity) and their task conguration, which jointly determine the expected productivity
of a given worker in the rm.2 Idle rms post vacancies and decide whether to search young workers
from the unemployment pool or workers currently employed in a rival rm. In the latest case, they
are randomly matched with a young and successful worker and make her an o¤er. Incumbent rms
have then the right to match the o¤er or let the worker leave for the new employer.
We characterize the steady state equilibrium of the industry. In equilibrium, there is a unique
capital stock such that more capitalized rms decide to poach workers from fellow employers and
rms with lower capital stocks will hire unemployed workers at their reservation wage. The poaching
game has a unique equilibrium in un-dominated strategies where the poaching rm only makes an
o¤er if it will not be matched by the current employer independently of the skill of the worker.
We also show that in equilibrium neither the most nor the least capitalized rms will distort their
task allocation. The rst group are never poached by a rival rm while the second group cannot
avoid it. On the other hand, those rms in the middle of the distribution may distort their task
allocation to deter poaching. By committing themselves to ine¢ cient technologies, rms retain their
successful workers with higher probability by reducing the probability that idle rms assign him to
be a high-skill worker. Thus, rms increase the ex-ante expected output of an old worker. Due to
linearity, the former e¤ect is independent of the capital stock as long as the rm is able to deter
some poaching rms. On the other hand, the latter e¤ect is increasing in the capital stock of the
rm, because more capitalized rms are able to retain more workers in the second period. Thus, the
use of ine¢ cient technologies is more prominent in bigger rms within this range of the distribution.
Eventually, however, as rms become more productive they are able to retain their best workers
without distorting their technology and so they choose the e¢ cient task combination.
3.1.1 Related literature
Most previous literature analyze the e¤ect of the disclosure mechanism in the equilibrium of the
market. For example, in Wolitzky (2012) prospect employers lack information about previous output
realization but the current employer may submit performance reports. He studies the e¤ect of
allowing for secret contracts between the worker and the current employer.
Koch (2009) studies a model under which the employer proposes di¤erent contracts to her workers.
The initial employer has two employees, one talented and one ordinary. After production takes place,
workers go to the labor market and other rms form beliefs about their abilities observing their
earnings. In this framework, the optimal contract never reveals perfectly workersskills.
The closest paper to us is Mukherjee (2008), who presents a career-concerns model with mobility
across rms and incumbent advantage. In his model the incumbent and "raider" rms are determined
ex-ante and both raiders are homogenous and compete for the worker in the second period. The
incumbent rm can commit whether to disclose her private information (at no cost). Most of the
analysis is similar to that of the present paper, but our industry-equilibrium framework o¤ers new
insights on the endogenous productivity distribution of rms and the equilibrium assignment of
2We assume that this capital stock is set once and for all periods and is observable to rival rms.
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workers to rms. In particular, we show that the ine¢ ciencies associated with adverse selection and
ine¢ cient matching are exacerbated due to the endogenous selection of rms into incumbents and
raiders.
3.2 Model
Environment:
There is an innite number of periods. At every period, the economy is populated by a unit
measure of rms and an incoming cohort of workers, with measure N > 1. Firms live innitely.
They are identied by their capital stock k  U [k; k]. Each rm (she) has a production technology
and has to hire one worker to produce with this technology (explained below). Workers (he) live
for two periods. At the rst period of their lives workers are young and, in the second period they
become old. They di¤er in their skills  2 fL; Hg, with L = 0 and H = 1. At any moment in
time, the proportion of high-skill workers in the incoming cohort of workers is equal to  2 (0; 1).
Firms and workers discount the future with the same discount factor . In each period, a rms
payo¤ is given by the di¤erence between her production and her workers salary while the workers
payo¤ is given by his salary. All players maximize their expected payo¤.
Firms Technology:
Each rm chooses her own technology. Parameters p and q characterize this technology in the
following way. If a rm with capital stock k hires a high-skill worker, she produces an output equal
to k with probability p when the worker is young. When this worker becomes old, the rm produces
an output equal to k with probability 1. On the other hand, if this rm hires a low-skill worker,
output k is realized with probability q when he is young and with probability 0 when he is old.3
The set of feasible technologies veries that p +  q = p, with p 2 [ p1+  ; p] and q 2 [0; p1+  ]. We
assume that  > 1  , so the rm chooses (p; 0) in a one-period game.
4 This technology is meant
to capture di¤erent ways in which rms may organize production, giving salience to better workers.
For instance, a rm may use very standardized procedures (which all workers are able to learn) or
very innovative ones (which o¤er a high skill premium).5 To describe the technology choosing, we
use the function p : [k; k]! [ p1+  ; p] (and q(k) = p p(k) ).
Timing:
At time t = 0 all rms choose (publicly) their technologies. This technology remains constant
during all the game.
In any other period t  1 rms are either idle (without a worker) or active (with a worker hired
in previous period). Active rms observe the skill of her own worker after production takes place
while idle rms do not observe workers skill at other rms. However, idle rms do observe if workers
at active rms have been successful in production or not.
Next, an idle rm decides whether to make an o¤er to a successful worker or hiring an unemployed
3Since L = 0 and H = 1, technology in second period can also be interpreted that the rm produces an output
equal to kL and kH respectively.
4Notice that  is the slope of the technology frontier and 1 

the slope of the isoquants of the rms. Therefore,
when  > 1 

, the optimal technology in a one-period game is at the corner where p  q
5One could interpret p and q as measuring the elasticity of substitution across high and low skilled labor in di¤erent
technologies
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worker.6 In the former case, the idle rm, which was randomly match with an active rm with a
successful worker, makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the worker. In case the o¤er is rejected, remain
idle for the rest of the period. The active rm has the right to match the o¤er and keep the successful
worker. We assume throughout that ring costs are prohibitive. Then, unsuccessful workers will
remain at the active rm.7
On the other hand, all active rms that lose their worker and all idle rms that do not look for
successful workers at rival rms are randomly match with a young worker at the unemployment pool.
Since employers are able to distinguish young and old workers and there is excess supply of young
workers (N > 1), old workers in the pool will not be hired and thus we assume that they leave it to
move to another industry.
Old workers that leave the industry and those who die after production in an active rm, are
replaced by young workers with the same skill level. These new young workers join the unemployment
pool.
Strategies
At the beginning of the game (at t = 0), the strategy of each rm is to choose p(k).
At every period t  1, a strategy (st; wt) of an idle rm is a function st : [k; k] ! fU;Pg which
species the action of hiring from the pool U or poaching from a rival rm P and a payment for
poaching wt : [k; k]2 ! <. A strategy (s^t; w^t) of an active rm is a function s^t : [k; k] ! fC;NCg
which species the action of making a counter o¤er C or not NC and a a payment w^t for the counter
o¤er w^t : [k; k]2fL; Hg ! <. Workers decide whether to accept or not an o¤er. Since we assume
that workers are subject to a limited liability constraint and that outside options for workers give
them zero payo¤s, when they are young they accept any non-negative salary and when they are old
they accept the best o¤er.
3.3 Analysis
In this section we study properties of a Steady State Equilibrium (dened below).8 In particular we
prove that it is in cuto¤ strategies and that some rms which go the the unemployment pool for
workers will distort their technology to deter poaching while others will not.
We proceed as follow. First, we assume that rms have chosen their optimal technologies at
t = 0. We also assume that a Steady State Equilibrium exists. Before studying its properties, in
next subsection we solve for wages when an idle rm decides to poach from an active rm. Next, we
dened our Steady State Equilibrium and we prove that it is in cuto¤ strategies. Finally, we solve
for p(k) at t = 0.
6Since p(k)  q(k), no output is always bad news about the worker is high-skill. Hence, rms that decided to poach
will target their search only to successful workers.
7Endogenous ring of unsuccessful workers would complicate the analysis without adding new insights.
8To nd equilibriums di¤erent to a steady state equilibrium (e.g. at t = 1 or t = 2), it would be necessary to track
the distributions of poaching rms and the distributions of rms that go to the pool for each previous period. This
task seems not very tractable.
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3.3.1 Poaching: Solving for Wages
We now simplify the game by eliminating weakly un-dominated wages in the poaching game. This
is, in this subsection, we want to know which are the o¤ers that the idle rm has to make in order
to be successful in poaching.
We assume that rms continuation values (when going to the pool or when poaching) are bounded
above, increasing in  and increasing in k.
First, notice that, since young workers accept any salary, when a rm is matched with a worker
from the unemployment pool she will o¤er a salary equal zero to him.
Now, we consider when an idle rm with capital k is matched with a worker at an active rm
with a capital stock kI . The idle rm makes an o¤er to the worker. The active rm decides whether
to match or not. If the o¤er is not matched, the worker leaves for the new rm. Otherwise the
worker stays. In the former case, the active rm has to go to the pool for a new worker. Lets denote
V U (kI) to her continuation values.
Since the idle rm can direct its matching to successful young workers, then the active rm
production was kI when she had chosen (pI ; qI). The expected output of this worker in the idle
rm is kkI ;1, where kI ;1 is the probability that the worker is high-skill conditional on successful in
production when he was at rm kI , and on kI rm failing to match the o¤er. On the other hand,
the expected output of the worker in the active rm is kI if he is a high-skill worker or 0 if he is a
low-skill worker, where this output is conditional on the succeed of the active rm in matching the
o¤er.
Thus, any o¤er ! > 0 will not be matched by the active rm if her worker is low-skill because
the active rm prefers going to the unemployment pool. In case that the active rm has a high-skill
worker, a wage equal to kI   (1   )V U (kI) makes the active rm indi¤erent between making the
countero¤er equal to this amount or going to the unemployment pool for a new worker. So, if an
idle rm makes an o¤er lower to that indi¤erence wage, the active rm prefers to match the o¤er,
keep her worker and going to the pool tomorrow than going to the pool today. Then, any o¤er
! < kI   (1  )V U (kI) is dominated by o¤ering ! = 0 with which the idle rm succeed in poaching
a low-skill worker only. However, unemployed workers in the pool may be high skilled with positive
probability and accept any non-negative wage. Hence, poaching low-skill workers is dominated by
hiring unemployed workers from the pool.
On the other hand, o¤ering kI   (1   )V U (kI) will not be matched in any case. This o¤er
guarantees to the idle rm to get a high-skill worker but also a low-skill one. Thus, the unique
equilibrium outcome in un-dominated strategies is to o¤er kI if and only if kkI ;1  kI .9
Lemma 32 If  ! 1, in equilibrium, an idle rm with capital stock k that chooses to poach and it
is matched with an active rm with capital stock kI makes an o¤er if and only if kkI ;1  kI   (1 
)V U (kI), and the o¤er it makes is !(k) = kI   (1  )V U (kI).
Proof. Direct from previous explanation.
Notice then, that in equilibrium, the active rm never makes a countero¤er.
9This equilibrium can be shown to be unique by adding an epsilon cost of making an o¤er
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3.3.2 Steady State Equilibrium
In this Section we introduce the problem and dene the Steady State Equilibrium we use to solve it.
Since the equilibrium is stationary, a rm that decides to poach (hiring from the pool) is going to
do it in every period.
Suppose a rm with capital stock k. In steady state, her expected total payo¤s when going to
the unemployment pool is
V U (k) =k	(p(k)) +  (1 	(p(k))) kk;0 + V U (k)
+ 	(p(k))

kk;1(k) + V
U (k)(k) + V U (k)(1  (k)) ; (3.1)
where
	(p(k)) = p(k)+ q(k)(1  ); k;0 = (1  p(k))
1 	(p(k)) ; k;1 =
p(k)
	(p(k))
;
are the probability that the worker is high-skill conditioned on a failure on production in previous
period and conditioned on a succeed on production in previous period, respectively, and (1   (k))
is the probability of being poached where (k) : [k; k]! [0; 1].10
On the other hand, in steady state, the expected total payo¤s of a rm k when decides to poach
from a randomly selected active rm that has a successful young worker, is
V P (k) =
Z  
kkI ;1   kI
+ 	(p(kI))Prob(kI 2 B)(2 (kI)2 )R
	(p(x))Prob(x 2 B)(2 (x)2 ))dF (x)
!
dF (kI) + V P (k); (3.2)
where
 kI ;1 = p(k
I)
	(p(kI)) is the probability that the worker is high-skill conditioned on a succeed on
production when he was at rm kI ,
 F (x) is the c.d.f. of x  U [k; k],
 B  fk : s(k) = Ug is the set of rms that hire workers from the unemployment pool,
 (kI) is the probability that the rm with capital stock kI is not poached, 11
 2 (kI)2 , assuming the equilibrium is stationary, this ratio is the proportion of periods with
young workers.12
Since workers will always choose to work for the highest paying rm and ring costs are pro-
hibitive, these equations completely dene the problems faced by each rm, given their initial capital
10Since poaching rms can direct their poaching to successful young worker, this probability is positive only if the
rm k goes to the pool for a worker and he is young and successful at the moment of being poached.
11We do not need an explicit expression for (k) for our analysis. We assume 0(k) > 0 and 00(k)  0.
12Each rm kI that goes today to the unemployment pool for a young worker, lose tomorrow its worker with
probability (1  (k)) and goes again to the pool for another young worker.
Chapter 3 53
stock and their technology choice.13 Since rms are innitely lived and population is stationary, we
dene a Steady State Equilibrium of the Industry as follows.
Denition 33 Given an optimal choice of (p(k); q(k)) by every rm k, a Steady State Equilibrium
is a fV (k); s(k);(k);(k)g such that, equilibrium payments are as described above, and
V (k) = max

V U (k); V P (k)
	
;
s(k) = U; if V U (k) > V P (k);
s(k) = P; otherwise;Z
s(k)=U
(1  (k))dF (k) =
Z
s(k)=P
(k)dF (k);
with (k) as the probability that the rm with capital stock k poaches from a rival.
The rst two equations just says that rms choose whether to search in the pool or poach from
another rm optimally, given that the environment is stationary. The last equation is a feasibility
constraint that requires that the "supply" and "demand" of poached workers are in equilibrium.14
3.3.3 Equilibrium Characterization
In what follows we shall assume that the discount factor approaches 1. We will now show that, if
there exists a Steady State equilibrium, it is in cuto¤ strategies such that s(k) = U for all k  k
and s(k) = P otherwise.
Proposition 34 Suppose  ! 1 and k > k(1 2) . Then, there exists k 2 (k; k) such that s(k) = U
if and only if k < k. Otherwise s(k) = U for all k.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This Proposition states that if there is enough heterogeneity across rms, there will be sorting of
rms into both markets, with bigger rms choosing to poach workers.
This allows us to rewrite the Equilibrium Condition as
Z k
k
(1  (k))dF (k) =
Z k
k
(k)dF (k)
Since all workers who are hired remain in the industry until they die, we have the following equalities.
Let S be the measure of workers hired when young, then
S =
Z k
k
2  (k)
2
dF (k)
=
Z k
k
(k)dF (k) +
Z k
k
(k)
2
dF (k):
13Recall that a rm poaches only workers who have been successful in previous period. Then those rms with capital
stock kI belong to the subset of rms that went to the unemployment pool for workers, they have a young worker and
have been successful in production.
14As we said for function (k), we neither need an explicit expression for (k). We assume 0(k) > 0 and 00(k)  0.
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The rst line of the equation says that the total number of workers hired when young in the industry
must equate the total number of rms who has recruited young workers, since each rm who chooses
to search in the pool spends 2 (k)2 proportion of periods with young workers. The second line says
that the total number of old workers equals the total number of rms recruiting from the pool who
did not lose their workers plus those rms who poach workers from another rm successfully.
3.4 Technology Choice
The equilibrium structure depends on the technology chosen by all rms at the beginning of the
game. Notice that increasing q has three e¤ects. First, q reduces the expected output of a young
worker since  > 1  , independently of k. Second, higher q decreases the expected skill of successful
workers, thereby deterring poaching. Finally, it increases the expected skill of unsuccessful workers
and, therefore, has an ambiguous e¤ect on the output of workers who do not change rms. These
last two e¤ects are only relevant for rms who may lose their workers to others in equilibrium. Thus,
rms which are not subject to losing their workers to bigger rms have no incentive to distort their
productivity.
Analogously, rms in the lower tail of the distribution of capital stocks are unable to deter other
rms to poach their successful workers. Nonetheless, they have a relatively unskilled labor force and
so may prot from increasing q in order to increase output. This is so if and only if 1  p  1    2 .
Finally, for rms in the middle of the distribution all three e¤ects are relevant. The direct e¤ect
on young workers and the e¤ect on deterrence are independent of the capital level (within this range).
The e¤ect on the expected output of a retained old worker may be non-monotonic in the level of
capital because bigger rms have higher probability of retention but also a better average worker. In
any case, as rms get bigger, this e¤ect starts to diminish and eventually becomes negative. Thus,
big enough rms prefer not to distort their technology.
Proposition 35 Let k1 2 (k;min

kk;1; k
	]. When  ! 1, the technology choice as a function
of k is as follows:
1. If 1  p < 1    2 , then:
(a) p(k) = p when k  k1,
(b) p(k) = p when k  k,
(c) p(k)  p otherwise;
2. if 1  p  1    2 , then:
(a) p(k) = p when k  k1,
(b) p(k)  p when k < k1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Welfare
It may be interesting to study the Social Planner Problem associated with this Industry, in the sense
of maximizing total surplus. Only e¢ cient technologies will be chosen in equilibrium. The First-Best
is thus dened as an allocation of workers to rms. Some rms are devoted to hire successful workers
while the remaining rms hire young workers and retain those that are unsuccessful.
E¢ cient allocation, which requires all rms to use the e¢ cient technology fp; 0g, is dened by a
cuto¤ k such that all rms with lower productivity than k are assigned to recruiting new workers
and maintain unsuccessful ones, while the remaining rms recruit successful workers.
The equilibrium cuto¤ level k may be too high or too low as compared with k. If k < k the
probability of a successful worker moving to a better rm is now higher than the optimal one. On
the other hand, if k > k there is too little mobility.
3.5.2 Transfer Fees
Adverse-selection leads incumbent employers to distort their technology to obtain rents. A standard
way to eliminate the ine¢ ciencies due to the adverse-selection issue is to eliminate the limited liability
constraint. Indeed, workers would then be willing to accept negative wages when young in order to
buy the opportunity to get promoted. This negative wage is a rent for the employer and it may aligned
her incentives with the social optimum. Limited liability and minimum wages are, however, relevant
in most interesting applications. In particular, in the markets we described in the Introduction,
successful workers may earn orders of magnitude more than unsuccessful ones (or drop-outs). Thus,
most workers are unable to nance their bid to show their ability.15
A potential solution to this problem is the introduction of transfer fees. If the fee (a transfer from
the worker to his current employer) equals the expected output (conditional on success), incumbent
rms have no longer interest in acquiring ine¢ cient technologies. This reduces the impact of adverse
selection and improves the allocation of workers to rms. Transfer fees are very prominent in some
specic environments like soccer, where worker turnover is very high (often from bad teams into
better ones, thus fostering assortative matching) and rents for workers may be extremely high.
Interestingly, most teams play their best prospects even if this ensures that they will lose them to
better teams.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper we propose a model to explain why some rms could choose technologies that harm
their payo¤s in the short-term. This is explained by the fact that they compete for high-skill workers
with rivals rms. This nding is consistent with anecdotal evidence. We have also propose some
interesting extensions.
15 Interestingly, this is not so in all markets. F1 pilots often pay to drive in smaller teams
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A.1 Sellers Sequential Problem
A general model of the sellers sequential problem has the following components.
The initial probability of facing a high-type buyer is denoted by pH;3, and for a low-type buyer
by pL;3 = 1  pH;3.
At every point in time r, we denote as yr+1  ( T ;mT ; :::; r+1;mr+1) to the history of past
actions up to r.
The probability pi;r that the seller assigns to type i -her beliefs- given that she observes history
yr is given by pi;r : yr ! [0; 1], and we denote by pr (yr) to the vector (pL;r (yr) ; pH;r (yr)).
Then at every period, the sellers strategy  r is to choose a mechanism  r given the history yr+1,
i.e.  r : yr+1 ! , where  is the space of mechanisms.
Next, the buyer observes his types i, the history and the mechanism proposed by the seller. His
strategy is to send a message mr 2 Mr with probability qi;r(), qi;r : Mr   r  yr+1 ! [0; 1], for
i 2 fL;Hg and that veries Pmr2Mr qi(mr;  r; yr+1) = 1. At next period,the seller updates her
beliefs and propose a new mechanism and so on.
Suppose we are in a two period game. Then, at r = 2 the seller wants to maximize her expected
payo¤,
Max
fqs;ps; sg1s=2
X
i2
pi;3
X
m22M2
qi;2 (m2; 2; y3) [w2(m2) + (A.1)

X
i2
pi;2 (y2)
X
m12M1
qi;1 (m1; 1; y2) [w1(m1)]]
subject to fqs; ps; sg1s=2 being PBE implementable.
In order to have a PBE, the buyers and sellers strategy must be best responses in every period.
Given  s, the buyer chooses his reporting strategy anticipating the future sellers beliefs (he maxi-
mizes his expected payo¤ (IC2)). As response to the buyers strategy, the seller species an optimal
outcome for next period (SRC1). Additionally, we have the buyers participation constraint (IR2)
and beliefs have to be consistent with Bayes Rule (BR2). Then, the sellers problem at (A.1) is
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constrained to the following conditions:
ICi;2 : fqi;s (ms; s; ys+1)g1s=2 2
argmax
f~qi;s(ms; s;ys+1)g1s=2
X
m22M2
~qi;2 (m2; 2; y3) [ui;2 (m2) +

X
m12M1
~qi;1 (m1; 1; y2) [ui;1 (m1)]]; 8i 2 ;
IRi;2 :
X
m22M2
qi;2 (m2; 2; y3) [ui;2 (m2) +

X
m12M1
qi;1 (m1; 1; y2) [ui;1 (m1)]]  0; 8i 2  with pi;3 > 0;
BR2 : pi;2(m2; 2; y3)
X
j2
pj;3qj;2(m2; 2; y3) = pi;3qi;2(m2; 2; y2);
SRC1 : Maxfq1;p1; 1g
X
i2
pi;2
X
m12M1
qi;1 (m1; 1; y2) [w1(m1)];
s:t: : ICi;1 ; IRi;1 ; BR1:
assuming that the reservation utility for every type is equal zero.
Then, the seller chooses the best fqs; ps; sg1s=2 between all of them that are PBE implementable.
In our particular specication, at any period r the prior has all the information that the seller
needs to take a decision. Then, we can write the previous problem as a recursive one where pr+1 is
the state variable at the beginning of each period r.
Suppose we are in the last period r = 1. Then, the seller solves,
V1(p2) = Maxfq1; 1g
X
i2
pi;2
X
m12M1
qi;1 (m1)w1(m1);
subject to
ICi;1 : qi;1 (m1) 2 argmax
f~qi;1(m1)g
X
m12M1
~qi;1 (m1)ui;1 (m1) 8i 2 ;
IRi;1 :
X
m12M1
qi;1 (m1)ui;1 (m1)  0 8i 2  with pi;2 > 0:
In r = 2,
V2(p3) = Maxfqt;pt; tg1t=2
X
i2
pi;3
X
m22M2
qi;2 (m2) [w2(m2) +

X
i2
pi;2 (m2)
X
m12M1
qi;1 (m1)w1(m1)];
subject to ICi;2, IRi;2, BR2 and SRC1. Following the Principle of Optimality, previous problem can
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be written as
V2(p3) = Maxfq2;p2; 2g
X
i2
pi;3
X
m22M2
qi;2 (m2) [w2(m2) + V1(p2)];
s:t: :
ICi;2 : qi;2 (m2) 2 arg maxf~qi;2(m2)g
X
m22M2
~qi;2 (m2) [ui;2 (m2) + Ui;1(m2)] 8i 2 ;
IRi;2 :
X
m22M2
qi;2 (m2) [ui;2 (m2) + Ui;1(m2)]  0 8i 2  for i such that pi;2 > 0;
and BR2, where Ui;1(m2) =
P
m12M2 qi;1 (m1)ui;1 (m1), i.e. the buyers payo¤s given by ICi;1.
A.2 Proof of Remark 1
Proof. Consider a message set M1 with two possible messages f"take  it"; "leave  it"g ; a mech-
anism with an allocation given by
x1(m1) =
(
1 if m1 = take  it;
0 if m1 = leave  it; ; m1 2M1;
probabilities of observing each message dened by
q^i(take  it)  qix1(h) + (1  qi)x1(l);
q^i(leave  it)  1  q^i(take  it);
By Revelation Principle qH = 1 and qL = 0 then q^H(take  it) = 1, q^L(take  it) = x1(l).
When pH;2 < LH the optimal direct selling mechanism has allocations x1(l) = 1, then q^L(take 
it) = 1. Using a price w^1(take  it) = L, instant payo¤s under both mechanisms are equal for every
player.
When pH;3  LH , x1(l) = 0 and q^L(take   it) = 0. The optimal direct selling mechanism has
payments w1(h) = H and w1(l) = 0. Using w^1(take   it) = w1(h), instant payo¤s under both
mechanisms are equal for every player.
Then, both mechanisms are payo¤ equivalent for every prior.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose an incentive feasible outcome (qr; pr; r), where  r is a direct mechanism, and with
qL > qH . By the revelation principle, qH > 0 and qL < 1. Since qL > qH , all IC constraints hold
with equality, i.e.
ICH;r : uH;r(h) + UH;r 1(pr(h)) = uH;r(l) + UH;r 1(pr(l));
ICL;r : uL;r(l) + UL;r 1(pr(l)) = uL;r(h) + UL;r 1(pr(h)):
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To be incentive feasible also IR and BR have to be satised,
IRH;r : uH;r(h) + UH;r 1(pr(h))  0;
IRL;r : uL;r(l) + UL;r 1(pr(l))  0;
BRr : pH;r (mr)
X
j2
pj;r+1qj (mr) = pH;r+1qH (mr) with mr = l; h:
The new outcome (q^r; p^r; r) is created by renaming types such that now, q^H = qL and q^L = qH .
Then q^H > q^L as is required. The new constraints are all satised, with ICH;r = IC^L;r, ICL;r =
IC^H;r, IRH;r = IR^L;r, IRL;r = IR^H;r and pH;r (mr) = p^L;r (mr).
Also, the seller remains indi¤erent, i.e.X
i2
X
mr2fl;hg
pi;r+1qi (mr) [vr(mr) + Vr 1(pr(mr))] =X
i2
X
mr2fl;hg
p^i;r+1q^i (mr) [vr(mr) + Vr 1(p^r(mr))] :
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. In order to prove this simplication for two periods we follow a similar procedure than in
the static case. So, this prove has four steps:
Step 1: ICH;2 + IRL;2 =) IRH;2,
First, notice that uH;2(m2) + UH;1(p2(m2))  uL;2(m2) + UL;1(p2(m2)) 8m2 by x2(m2)H  
w2(m2)  x2(m2)L   w2(m2) and by UL;1 (p2) = 0 8p2 and UH;1 (p2)  0 8p2, from solution at
period r = 1.
From previous result, uH;2(l) + UH;1(p2(l))  uL;2(l) + UL;1(p2(l)). By IRL;2, uL;2(l) +
UL;1(p2(l))  0. It follows that uH;2(h) + UH;1(p2(h))  0 by ICH;2, i.e. IRH;2 holds.
Step 2: Optimality =) IRL;2 + ICH;2,
By optimality we mean that the seller proposes an outcome (q2; p2; 2) that maximize her prots.
From step 1, uH;2(h) + UH;1(p2(h))  uL;2(l) + UL;1(p2(l)).
We now assume that both types start with the same payment w^2, then
x2(h)H   w^2 + UH;1(p2(h))  x2(l)L   w^2 + UL;1(p2(l)) > 0:
In order to improve her payo¤s, the seller can increase the payment w^2 asked to both types by some
amount. She continues doing that up to w that makes x^2L   w^2 + UL;1(p2(l)) w = 0. Fixing
w2(l) = w^2 +w we get IRL;2 is binding. Note that ICH;2 and ICL;2 both hold while changing w^2
because it was present at both sides of these expressions.
Once the seller xes w2(l), she continues increasing the payment for message h by w0 up to
x2(h)H   (w^2 +w) + UH;1(p2(h)) w0 = x2(l)L   (w^2 +w) + UL;1(p2(l)):
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At this point, the seller does not increase the payment anymore. If it were the case, the high-type
buyer will send a low-type message, violating the ICH;2. As consequence, optimality also implies
ICH;2. Note that ICL;2 continues holding while the seller increases the payment w
0 for message h
-an increment in w0 a¤ects only the RHS of the ICL;2.
Step 3: IRL;2 + IC

H;2 + SMC2 , IRL;2 + ICH;2 + ICL;2
(: we have
ICH;2: x2(h)H   w2(h) + UH;1 (p2(h)) = x2(l)H   w2(l) + UH;1 (p2(l)) ;
ICL;2: x2(l)L   w2(l) + UL;1 (p2(l))  x2(h)L   w2(h) + UL;1 (p2(h)) ;
with equality if qL > 0:
IRL;2: x2(l)L   w2(l) + UL;1 (p2(l)) = 0;
from IRL;2 and by backward induction we know that UL;1 (p2(l)) = UL;1 (p2(h)) = 0. Operating with
ICH;2 we get:
w2(h)  w2(l) = x2(h)H   x2(l)H +  [UH;1 (p2(h))  UH;1 (p2(l))] ;
plugging it into ICL;2 and operating we get the Sequential Monotonicity Constraint (SMC2):
x2(h) + 
UH;1 (p2(h))

 x2(l) + UH;1 (p2(l))

; with equality if qL > 0:
): Starting from the SMC2, multiplying it by  and using ICH;2 and IRL;2 it is possible to
recover ICL;2:
A.5 Lemma 4
Lemma 36 A mechanism with SMC non-binding with no-learning can be o¤ered only when pH;3 
L
2H
+ LH and a mechanism with SMC non-binding with learning can be o¤ered only when pH;3  LH .
Mechanisms with SMC binding have no restrictions on the prior.
Proof. A mechanism with SMC non-binding with no-learning requires qL = 0, H;3  LH and
pH;2(l)  LH . Since qL = 0, from H;3  LH it is necessary qH  LHpH;3 and from pH;2(l)  LH ,
qH  1  (1 pH;3)pH;3 L . Both conditions are satised when pH;3  L2H +
L
H
.
A mechanism with SMC non-binding with learning requires qL = 0, H;3  LH and pH;2(h) 
L
H
> pH;2(l). Since qL = 0, from H;3  LH , it must be that qH  LHpH;3 and, from LH > pH;2(l), it
must be qH  1  (1 pH;3)pH;3 L . Since, qH 2 [0; 1] rst condition is satised only when pH;3  LH , and
the second one when pH;3 < 1.
Finally, a mechanism with SMC binding requires qL 6= 0 or qL = 0 and H;3 < LH . In case of
learning, it also requires pH;2(h)  1 (when pH;3 < LH ) or pH;2(l) < LH (when pH;3  LH ). In case
of no-learning, pH;2(h) < 1 when pH;3 <
L
H
or pH;2(l)  LH when pH;3  LH . There is no restriction
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on the prior for both cases of SMC binding.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. It remains to get payments for both messages. We proceed by calculating them for calculating
them for the optimal mechanism for every prior.
In the case of SMC binding with no-learning, since x2(l) = 1, w2(l) = L by substituting in
IRL;2. From IC

H;2 we get w2(h) = L, when substituting in it x2(l), w2(l) and using UH;3 (p2(h)) =
UH;3 (p2(l)).
In the case of SMC not binding with learning, w2(l) = 0 by IRL;2 and x2(l) = 0. Since
UH;3 (p2(l))  UH;3 (p2(l)) = , w2(h) = H    from ICH;2.
Finally, when SMC not binding with no-learning, again w2(l) = 0 by x2(l) = 0. Now UH;3 (p2(h)) =
UH;3 (p2(l)), giving w2(h) = H .
A.7 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Consider a message set M2 with two possible messages f"take  it"; "leave  it"g ; a mech-
anism with an allocation given by
x2(m2) =
(
1 if m2 = take  it;
0 if m2 = leave  it; ; m2 2M2;
probabilities of observing each message dened by
q^i(take  it)  qix2(h) + (1  qi)x2(l);
q^i(leave  it)  1  q^i(take  it);
and posteriors p^i;2(take  it) and p^i;2(leave  it) are given by Bayes rule.
When pH;3 < LH the optimal direct selling mechanism has allocations x2(h) = x2(l) = 1, then
q^H(take it) = 1, q^L(take it) = 1 and p^H;2(take it) = pH;3. It follows that continuation values with
the price posting are equal than under the direct mechanisms, i.e. Ui;1(p^2(take  it)) = Ui;1(pH;2(h))
for both types and V1(p^2(take   it)) = V1(pH;2(h)). Using a price w^2(take   it) = L, also instant
payo¤s under both mechanisms are equal for every player.
When pH;3  LH the optimal direct selling mechanism has payments w2(h) = H and w2(l) = 0,
or w2(h) = H    and w2(l) = 0; with allocations x2(h) = 1 and x2(l) = 0. It follows that,
q^H(take it) = qH and q^L(take it) = qL and p^H;2(take it) = pH;2(h) and p^H;2(leave it) = pH;2(l).
Again, continuation values are equal for both mechanisms, i.e. Ui;1(p^2(take   it)) = Ui;1(p2(h)),
Ui;1(p^2(leave   it)) = Ui;1(p2(l)), V1(p^2(take   it)) = V1(p2(h)) and V1(p^2(leave   it)) = V1(p2(l)).
Using w^2(take  it) = w2(h), also instant payo¤s under both mechanisms are equal for every player.
Then, for every prior, it is possible to implement an outcome (q^2; p^2;  ^2); where  ^2 is a price
posting mechanism, which is payo¤ equivalent to the incentive e¢ cient outcome (q2; p2; 2) that
solves (1.8)
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A.8 Example 1: Proof
Proof. To see this notice rst that the optimal mechanism under case 2 implies qH = 1; qL = 0.
Then, following denitions at the proof of Corollary 1, if this optimal mechanism can be implemented
by a price posting, it should imply q^H(take  it) = x2(h) (i.e. q^H(take  it) = 1) and q^L(take  it) =
x2(l) (i.e. q^L(take  it) = 1   = 0:75).
Suppose the seller proposes a price lower to L. The low-type buyer makes zero payo¤s at last
period, and today he gets positive prots sending "take   it" and zero with "leave   it". Then,
q^L(take  it) = 1 which is a contradiction. This price cannot be optimal.
Suppose the seller proposes a price larger than L. Now, low-type buyer strictly prefers sending
"leave  it", otherwise he makes negative prots. Then, q^L(take  it) = 0 which is a contradiction.
This price cannot be optimal.
Suppose a price equal to L. If the seller does not learn, she asks for a price equal to the low-type
buyers valuation in the second period (recall pH;3 < LH ), making V2 = L+L which is lower than
V2 = 2:17. If she learns, in the second period she proposes a di¤erent price for each message observed
in the rst period. Since q^H(take   it) = 1, p^H;2(take   it) > 0 and p^H;2(leave   it) = 0. Then, in
case of learning, in the second period she proposes a price equal to the high-type buyers valuation
if she observes "take   it" in the rst period and a price equal to the low-type buyers valuation if
she observes "leave  it". Seller gets
V2 = L + pH;3H +  [1  pH;3   (1  pH;3)(1  )] L;
equal to V2 = 1; 8333 for the parameters of the example. Then, this price cannot be optimal.
Appendix B
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B.1 Sellers Sequential Problem
A general model of the sellers sequential problem has the following components.
The initial probability of facing a high-type buyer is denoted by pH;T+1, and for a low-type buyer
by pL;T+1 = 1  pH;T+1.
At every point in time r, we denote as yr+1  ( T ;mT ; :::; r+1;mr+1) to the history of past
actions up to r.
The probability that the seller assigns to type i given that she observes history yr is given by
pi;r : yr ! [0; 1], with pr  (pL;r(yr); pH;r(yr)).
Then at every period, the sellers strategy  r is to choose a mechanism  r given the history yr+1,
i.e.  r : yr+1 ! , where  is the space of mechanisms.
Next, the buyer observes his types i, the history and the mechanism proposed by the seller. His
strategy is to send a message mr 2Mr with probability qi;r(), where qi;r :Mr   r  yr+1 ! [0; 1],
for i 2 fL;Hg and that veries Pmr2Mr qi(mr;  r; yr+1) = 1. At next period,the seller updates her
beliefs and propose a new mechanism and so on.
Suppose we are at period r. Then, the seller wants to maximize her expected payo¤,
Max
fqs;ps; sg1s=r
X
i2
pi;r+1
X
mr2Mr
qi;r (mr; r; yr+1) [wr(mr) + (B.1)

X
i2
pi;r (yr)
X
mr 12Mr 1
qi;r 1 (mr 1; r 1; yr) [wr 1(mr 1) +
2
X
i2
pi;r 1 (yr 1)
X
mr 22Mr 2
qi;r 2 (mr 2; r 2; yr 1) [wr 2(mr 2) + :::]]];
subject to fqs; ps; sg1s=r being PBE implementable.
In order to have a PBE, the buyers and sellers strategy must be best responses in every period.
Given  s, the buyer chooses his reporting strategy anticipating the future sellers beliefs (he maxi-
mizes his expected payo¤ (ICr)). As response to the buyers strategy, the seller species an optimal
sequence of mechanisms for the remainder of the game (SRC ). Additionally, we have the buyers
participation constraint (IRr) and beliefs have to be consistent with Bayes Rule (BRr). Then, the
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sellers problem at (B.1) is constrained to the following conditions:
ICi;r : fqi;s (ms; s; ys+1)g1s=r 2
argmax
f~qi;s(ms; s;ys+1)g1s=r
X
mr2Mr
~qi;r (mr; r; yr+1) [ui;r (mr) +

X
mr 12Mr 1
~qi;r 1 (mr 1; r 1; yr) [ui;r 1 (mr 1) + :::]]; 8i 2 ;
IRi;r :
X
mr2Mr
qi;r (mr; r; yr+1) [ui;r (mr) +

X
mr 12Mr 1
qi;r 1 (mr 1; r 1; yr) [ui;r 1 (mr 1) + :::]]  0; 8i 2  with pi;r+1 > 0;
BRr : pi;s(ms; s; ys 1)
X
j2
pj;s 1qj;s(ms; s; ys 1) = pi;s 1qi;s(ms; s; ys 1) ; s = fr; r   1; :::; 1g ;
SRC : for all  ;  = r   1; :::; 1 :
Max
fqs^;ps^; s^g1s^=
X
i2
pi;s^ 1
X
ms^2Ms^
qi;s^ (ms^; s^; ys^ 1) [ws^(ms^) + 
X
i2
pi;s^ (ys^) :::];
s:t: : ICi;s^ ; IRi;s^ ; BRs^:
where ui;r (mr) = xr (mr) i   wr (mr), and assuming that the reservation utility for every type is
equal zero.
Then, the seller chooses the best fqs; ps; sg1s=r between all of them that are PBE implementable.
In our particular specication, at any period r the prior has all the information that the seller
needs to take a decision. Then, we can write the previous problem as a recursive one where pr+1 is
the state variable at the beginning of each period r.
Suppose we are in the last period r = 1. Then, the seller solves,
V1(p2) = Maxfq1; 1g
X
i2
pi;2
X
m12M1
qi;1 (m1)w1(m1);
subject to
ICi;1 : qi;1 (m1) 2 argmax
f~qi;1(m1)g
X
m12M1
~qi;1 (m1)ui;1 (m1) 8i 2 ;
IRi;1 :
X
m12M1
qi;1 (m1)ui;1 (m1)  0 8i 2  with pi;2 > 0:
In r = 2,
V2(p3) = Maxfqt;pt; tg1t=2
X
i2
pi;3
X
m22M2
qi;2 (m2) [w2(m2) +

X
i2
pi;2 (m2)
X
m12M1
qi;1 (m1)w1(m1)];
subject to ICi;2, IRi;2, BR2 and SRC1. Following the Principle of Optimality, previous problem can
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be written as
V2(p3) = Maxfq2;p2; 2g
X
i2
pi;3
X
m22M2
qi;2 (m2) [w2(m2) + V1(p2)];
s:t: :
ICi;2 : qi;2 (m2) 2 arg maxf~qi;2(m2)g
X
m22M2
~qi;2 (m2) [ui;2 (m2) + Ui;1(m2)] 8i 2 ;
IRi;2 :
X
m22M2
qi;2 (m2) [ui;2 (m2) + Ui;1(m2)]  0 8i 2  for i such that pi;2 > 0;
and BR2, where Ui;1(m2) =
P
m12M2 qi;1 (m1)ui;1 (m1), i.e. the buyers payo¤s given by ICi;1.
Recursively, lets just call Vr(pr+1) to the problem in (B.1) at r. Then, given her beliefs, the
seller solves
Vr(pr+1) = Maxfqr;pr; rg
"X
i2
pi;r+1
X
mr2Mr
qi;r (mr) (wr(mr) + Vr 1(pr))
#
;
subject to ICi;r, IRi;r and BRr where
Vr 1(pr) = Maxfqr 1;pr 1; r 1g
24X
i2
pi;r
X
mr 12Mr 1
qi;r 1 (mr 1) (wr 1(mr 1) + Vr 2(pr 1))
35
is the SRC(r 1) which is subject to ICi;r 1, IRi;r 1 and BRr 1 with Vr 2(pr 1) as the SRC(r 2)
and so on.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose an incentive feasible outcome (qr; pr; r), where  r is a direct mechanism, and with
qL > qH . By the revelation principle, qH > 0 and qL < 1. Then all IC constraints hold with equality,
i.e.
ICH;r : uH;r(h) + UH;r 1(pr(h)) = uH;r(l) + UH;r 1(pr(l));
ICL;r : uL;r(l) + UL;r 1(pr(l)) = uL;r(h) + UL;r 1(pr(h)):
To be incentive feasible also IR and BR have to be satised,
IRH;r : uH;r(h) + UH;r 1(pr(h))  0;
IRL;r : uL;r(l) + UL;r 1(pr(l))  0;
BRr : PH;r (mr)
X
j2
pj;r+1qj (mr) = pH;r+1qH (mr) with mr = l; h:
The new outcome (q^r; p^r; r) is created by renaming types. This is, q^H = qL, q^L = qH . Then
q^H > q^L as is required. The new constraints are all satised, with ICH;r = IC^L;r, ICL;r = IC^H;r,
IRH;r = IR^L;r, IRL;r = IR^H;r and PH;r (mr) = P^L;r (mr).
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Also, the seller remains indi¤erent, i.e.X
i2
X
mr2fl;hg
pi;r+1qi (mr) [vr(mr) + Vr 1(pr)] =X
i2
X
mr2fl;hg
p^i;r+1q^i (mr) [vr(mr) + Vr 1(p^r)] :
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. In order to prove this simplication for any r we follow a similar procedure than in the static
case. So, this prove has four steps:
Step 1: ICH;r + IRL;r =) IRH;r,
First, notice that uH;2(m2) + UH;1(p2(m2))  uL;2(m2) + UL;1(p2(m2)) 8m2 by x2(m2)H  
w2(m2)  x2(m2)L   w2(m2) and by UL;1 (p2) = 0 8p2 and UH;1 (p2)  0 8p2, from solution at
period r = 1.
From previous result, uH;2(l) + UH;1(p2(l))  uL;2(l) + UL;1(p2(l)). By IRL;2, uL;2(l) +
UL;1(p2(l))  0. It follows that uH;2(h) + UH;1(p2(h))  0 by ICH;2, i.e. IRH;2 holds.
Now, suppose we are at an arbitrary period r. So, lets assume that UH;r 1(pr(mr))  UL;r 1(pr(mr))
8mr. Since xr(mr)H   wr(mr)  xr(mr)L   wr(mr) then
uH;r(mr) + UH;r 1(pr(mr))  uL;r(mr) + UL;r 1(pr(mr)) 8mr:
By IRL;r, uH;r(l)+UH;r 1(pr(l))  0. Finally, by ICH;r, it follows that uH;r(h)+UH;r 1(pr(h)) 
0 and IRH;r holds.
Step 2: Optimality =) IRL;r + ICH;r,
By optimality we mean that the seller proposes an outcome (qr; pr; r) that maximize her prots.
From step 1, uH;r(h) + UH;r 1(pr(h))  uL;r(l) + UL;r 1(pr(l)).
We now assume that both types start with the same payment w^r, then
xr(h)H   w^r + UH;r 1(pr(h))  xr(l)L   w^r + UL;r 1(pr(l)) > 0:
In order to improve her payo¤s, the seller can increase the payment w^r asked to both types by some
amount. She continues doing that up to w that makes x^rL w^r+UL;r 1(pr(l)) w = 0. Fixing
wr(l) = w^r +w we get IRL;r binding. Note that ICH;r and ICL;r both hold while changing w^r.
Once the seller xes wr(l), she continues increasing the payment for message h by w0 up to
xr(h)H   (w^r +w) + UH;r 1(pr(h)) w0 = xr(l)L   (w^r +w) + UL;r 1(pr(l)):
At this point, the seller does not increase the payment anymore. If it were the case, the high-type
buyer will send a low-type message, violating the ICH;r. As consequence, optimality also implies
ICH;r. Note that ICL;r continues holding while the seller increases the payment w
0 for message h
-an increment in w0 a¤ects only the RHS of the ICL;r.
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Step 3: IRL;r + IC

H;r + SMCr , IRL;r + ICH;r + ICL;r
(: we have
ICH;r: xr(h)H   wr(h) + UH;r 1 (pr(h)) = xr(l)H   wr(l) + UH;r 1 (pr(l)) ;
ICL;r: xr(l)L   wr(l) + UL;r 1 (pr(l))  xr(h)L   wr(h) + UL;r 1 (pr(h)) ;
with equality if qL > 0:
IRL;r: xr(l)L   wr(l) + UL;r 1 (pr(l)) = 0;
from IRL;r and by backward induction we know that UL;r 1 (pr(l)) = UL;r 1 (pr(h)) = 0. Operating
with ICH;r we get:
wr(h)  wr(l) = xr(h)H   xr(l)H +  [UH;r 1 (pr(h))  UH;r 1 (pr(l))] ;
plugging it into ICL;r and operating we get the Sequential Monotonicity Constraint (SMCr):
xr(h) + 
UH;r 1 (pr(h))

 xr(l) + UH;r 1 (pr(l))

; with equality if qL > 0:
): Starting from the SMCr, multiplying it by  and using ICH;r and IRL;r it is possible to
recover ICL;r:
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We proceed by induction.
From initial conditions, 2 =
L
Hq2 (

2)
.
For r > 2, assume that r 1 =
L
Hqr 1(

r 1)
.
From denition of r
qr (

r)

r

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)  r 1

+ (1  qr (r)r)  ~Vr 1
 
r 1

= L +  ~Vr 1 (r) : (B.2)
Now, lets dene 	r 1 (p) as
	r 1 (p)  qr 1(p)p

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)

+
 
1  qr 1(p)p

 ~Vr 1
 
r 1
  pqr 1(p)r 2; 8p:
Since qr 1(p) =
(p r 2)
p(1 r 2) ) q

r 1(1) = 1; and 	r 1 (1) =

H +  ~Vr 2 (1)

  r 2. By
denition of ~Vr 1 (p) follows that ~Vr 1 (1) = H + r 1 ~Vr 2 (1). Then, we can write ~Vr 1 (1) as equal
to 	r 1 (1) + r 2 and (B.2) as
qr (

r)

r (H + 	r 1 (1)) + (1  qr (r)r)  ~Vr 1
 
r 1

= L +  ~Vr 1 (r) ; (B.3)
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where ~Vr 1
 
r 1

and ~Vr 1 (r) are, by denition,
qr 1(

r 1)

r 1 (	r 1 (1)) +
 
1  qr 1(r 1)r 1

 ~Vr 2
 
r 2

;
and
qr 1(

r)

r (	r 1 (1)) +
 
1  qr 1(r)r

 ~Vr 2
 
r 2

;
respectively.
Since qr (r)r+(1  qr (r)r) qr 1(r 1)r 1 is equal to qr 1(r)r and
 
1  qr 1(r 1)r 1

(1  qr (r)r
is equal to
 
1  qr 1(r)r

, the LHS of (B.3) reduces to qr (r)rH +  ~Vr 1 (r). As consequence,
qr (r)rH = L, proving the last part.
Finally, using the denition of qr (r), then r =
L
H
 
1  r 1

+r 1. Suppose r 1 =
L
H
Pr 3
i=0


H
i
,
then r =
L
H
Pr 2
i=0


H
i
.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. From initial conditions, 2 =
L[H+]
H [L+]
and 2 =
L
H
. From denition of  r,
qr( r) r

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)

+ (1  qr( r) r)  ~Vr 1 ( r 1) = (B.4)
qr ( r) r

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)  r 1

+ (1  qr ( r) r)  ~Vr 1
 
r 1

:
The limit of the LHS at (B.4) for 3 ! 1 is H +  ~V2 (1) and the one for the RHS is equal to
H+ ~V2 (1) 2, which is lower than the LHS. On the other hand, the limit for 3 ! 2 is  ~V2 (2)
for LHS and q3(2)2

H +  ~V2 (1)  2

+ (1  q3(2)2)  ~V2 (2) for RHS. From solutions for
the two period case we know that,
~V2 (2) = 2H + L;
~V2 (1) = H + H ;
~V2 (

2) = L + L;
so we get that the limit for RHS is larger than the one to the LHS and equal to 2H + L + 2L:
Since LHS and RHS are both continuous, then there exists at least one point such that they are
equal. The derivatives of the LHS and RHS w.r.t.  r are constant then, the solution of (B.4) for 3
must be unique.
For r > 3, assume that the solution of (B.4) for  r 1 exists and it is unique.
Taking the limit for the LHS at (B.4) for  r ! 1, we nd that it is equal to H +  ~Vr 1 (1) ; and
the one for RHS is H +  ~Vr 1 (1)   r 1. Notice, that the limit for the LHS is larger than the
one for RHS.
On the other hand, taking the limit of the LHS at (B.4) for  r !  r 1, we get  ~Vr 1 ( r 1). For
the RHS we get qr ( r 1) r 1

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)  r 1

+ (1  qr ( r 1) r 1)  ~Vr 1
 
r 1

, which
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follows the denition of ~Vr (p) for p 2 [r ;  r) when p =  r 1, i.e. ~Vr ( r 1). As ~Vr (p) is increasing
in r, the limit for  r !  r 1 of the LHS is now lower than the limit of the RHS.
Since LHS and RHS are both continuous, then there exists at least one point such that they are
equal. The derivatives of the LHS and RHS w.r.t.  r are constant then, the solution of (B.4) for  r
must be unique.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Suppose p   r. Denitions of continuation values for this range of beliefs
~Vr(p) = qr(p)p

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)

+ (1  qr(p)p)  ~Vr 1 ( r 1) ;
~Ur(p) = (1  qr(p)p)  ~Ur 1 ( r 1) :
Applying the functional form to ~Vr 1 (1), ~Vr 1 ( r 1) and ~Ur 1 ( r 1),
~Vr 1 (1) = H
r 2X
i=0
i;
~Vr 1 ( r 1) =  r 1H
r 3X
i=0
iqr 1 i( r 1) + r 2 r 1H ;
~Ur 1 ( r 1) = 0:
Plugging them into ~Vr(p) and ~Ur(p) , and after some operations,
~Vr(p) = qr(p)pH + qr(p)pt 1H
r 2X
i=1
i + (1  qr(p)p)  r 1H
r 2X
i=1
iqr i( r 1) + r 1pH :
~Ur (p) = 0:
For ~Vr(p), since qr(p)p+ (1  qr(p)p)  r 1qr i( r 1) = pqr i(p), then we can write it as
~Vr(p) = qr(p)pH + pH
r 2X
i=1
iqr i(p) + r 1pH :
Both, ~Vr(p) and ~Ur(p), follow the functional form for p   r, with 
r(p) = ?.
Suppose p 2 [r ;  r). Now, from denitions of continuation values,
~Vr(p) = q

r (p)p

H +  ~Vr 1 (1)

+ (1  qr (p)p)  ~Vr 1
 
r 1
  pqr (p)r 1;
~Ur(p) = (1  qr (p)p)  ~Ur 1
 
r 1

+ r 1:
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Again, applying the functional form to ~Vr 1 (1), ~Vr 1
 
r 1

and and ~Ur 1
 
r 1

~Vr 1 (1) = H
r 2X
i=0
i;
~Vr 1
 
r 1

= r 1H
r 3X
i=0
iqr 1 i(

r 1) + 
r 2L;
~Ur 1
 
r 1

= r 2:
Plugging them into ~Vr(p) and ~Ur(p) , and using qr (p)p+ (1  qr (p)p) r 1qr i(r 1) = pqr i(p); we
get,
~Vr(p) = q

r (p)pH + pH
r 2X
i=1
iqr i(p) + 
r 1L;
~Ur(p) = 
r 1;
following the functional forms of continuation values for p 2 [r ;  r), again with with 
r(p) = ?.
Finally, suppose p < r . From denitions of continuation values,
~Vr(p) = L +  ~Vr 1 (p) ;
~Ur (p) = L +  ~Ur 1 (p) :
Applying the functional form to ~Vr 1(p) and ~Ur 1 (p),
~Vr 1 (p) = L
X
i2
r 1(p)
i + pH
X
i2
r 1(p)
q^r 1 i(p)i + r 2L;
~Ur 1 (p) = 
X
i2
r 1(p)
i + r 2;
and plugging them into ~Vr(p) and ~Ur (p),
~Vr(p) = L
X
i2
r(p)
i + pH
X
i2
r(p)
q^r i(p)i + r 1L;
~Ur (p) = 
X
i2
r(p)
i + r 1;
following the functional form of continuation values for p < r .
B.7 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. We rst show that r =  r 18r  2, when  = 1:
We proceed by induction. The result is direct for r = 2 since by denition 2 =
L
H
and 1 = LH .
It follows that q3 (p) = q2 (p) by their denition.
For r > 2, suppose r i =  r 1 i 8i 2 f1; :::; r   2g, then, from their denitions it must be
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qr+1 i (p) = qr i (p). Additionally, from denitions of  r and ~Vr(p), applying Lemma 6 and after
some simplications, we get
 r 1H
r 3X
i=0
i

qr 1 i ( r 1)  qr 1 i ( r 1)

= r 2L   r 2 r 1H : (B.5)
This expression, when  = 1, and using that qr+1 i (p) = qr i (p) (due to 

r i =  r 1 i by assump-
tion) becomes  r 1qr 1( r 1) = LH . From Lemma 4, 

rq

r (

r) =
L
H
, and since qr (p) = qr 1(p) (due
to r 1 =  r 2 for i = 1 by assumption), it follows that r =  r 1.
Now, lets consider the case  ! 1.
Again, we proceed by induction. For r = 2, 2 = 1 =
L
H
and 0 = 0 from initial conditions.
For r = 3, 3 =
L
H

1 + H

from Lemma 4 and 2 =
L[H+]
H [L+]
from initial conditions. Value of
2 is larger than 3 for  < 1. It follows that q4 (p) > q3 (p) by their denition.
For r > 2, we rst show that @r 1@ < 0. Suppose 

r i <  r 1 i 8i 2 f1; :::; r   2g, then
qr 1 i (p) > qr 2 i (p) from their denitions. Lets also assume that
@r 1 i
@ < 0 8i 2 f1; :::; r   2g.
Expression (B.5) can be written as
 r 1H
 
1 
r 3X
i=0
i r+2

qr 1 i ( r 1)  qr 1 i ( r 1)
!  L = 0:
LHS is a function of ,  r 1 and  r 1 i.1 Lets call it F (;  r 1;  r 1 i), and lets apply the implicit
function theorem, i.e.
@ r 1
@
=
 @F@   @F@r 2 i
@r 2 i
@
@F
@r 1
:
As (i  r + 2) < 0 8i 2 f0; :::; r   3g then @F@ > 0. Also, @F@r 2 i < 0 (due to
@qr 1 i(r 1)
@r 2 i
< 0) and,
since @r 2 i@ < 0 by assumption, then the numerator is negative. On the other hand,
@F
@r 1
> 0 (i.e.
the denominator is positive) because, rst 
1 
r 3X
i=0
i r+2

qr 1 i ( r 1)  qr 1 i ( r 1)
!
has to be positive to have (B.5) equal to zero ( r 1 for r > 2, H , and L are all positive) and,
second
@qr 1 i ( r 1)
@ r 1
  @qr 1 i ( r 1)
@ r 1
< 0;
by denitions of qr and qr, and using the assumption r 1 i <  r 2 i and that 

r 2 i < 

r 1 i
from Lemma 4. It follows that @r 1@ < 0.
1Although we do not write it explicitely, r 1 and r 1 i depends on . By denition, qr i (r 1) depends on
r 1 i(). On the other hand, qr 1 i (r 1) depends on 

r 1 i which does not change with .
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As r =  r 1 when  = 1, then r 2 ( r 2;  r 1) when  ! 1 by continuity.
B.8 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Since p (h)  p  p (l), and since 
r(p) is increasing in p by denition, it follows that
j
r 1(p (h))j  j
r 1(p (l))j.
When qL 6= 0, the SMCt is binding and as consequence xr(l) = 1 +  ~Ur 1(p(h))   
~Ur 1(p(l))
 .
Using the functional forms for continuation values,
xt(l) = 1 
P
i2
r 1(p(l))n
r 1(p(h)) 
i   r 1I(p(l);p(h)]( r 1):
In order to keep xr(l)  0, 
r 1(p (l))n
r 1(p (h)) = ; when I(p(l);p(h)]( r 1) is equal 1, and at
most 1 when I(p(l);p(h)]( r 1) is equal 0. Then, j
r 1(p (l))n
r 1(p (h))j  1.
When qL = 0, the allocation for low type message can also be xr(l) = 0 (H >
L
H
) or xr(l) = 1
(H <
L
H
). Under xr(l) = 0 (xr(l) = 1) it must be that j
r 1(p (l))n
r 1(p (h))j  1 (j
r 1(p (h))j =
j
r 1(p (l))j), otherwise the di¤erence between the continuation values for each message violates the
SMCr. To restore the SMCr and make it binding, xr(l) = 1 + 
~Ur 1(p(h))
   
~Ur 1(p(l))
 which is the
case explained above.
To see that 
r 1(p (l))n
r 1(p (h)) = max i 2 
r 1(p (l)) when j
r 1(p (l))n
r 1(p (h))j = 1, let

r 1(p (l)) = f0; 1; :::; jg, 
r 1(p (h)) = f0; 1; :::; kg with k  j for j; k 2 f0; 1; :::; r   2g. Then, it
must be that k = j   1 and 
r 1(p (l))n
r 1(p (h)) = j. Otherwise j
r 1(p (l))n
r 1(p (h))j > 1.
B.9 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. The proof is by application of Lemma 6 for each case.
When 
r 1(p (l)) = 
r 1(p (h)), learning is possible only if p (h)   r 1 and p (l) 2

r 1;  r 1

.
If p (h)   r 1 and p (l)   r 1 we are in no-learnin·g. If p (h) <  r 1 either 
r 1(p (l)) 6= 
r 1(p (h))
(contradiction) or 
r 1(p (l)) = 
r 1(p (h)) with ~Ur 1 (p(l)) = ~Ur 1 (p(h)) and we are in no-learnin·g
again.
When 
r 1(p (h)) = 
r 1(p (l))nmax fi 2 
r 1(p (l))g (i.e. j
r 1(p (l))j   j
r 1(p (h))j = 1), we
have ~Ur 1 (p(l)) > ~Ur 1 (p(h)). Since p (h)  p  p (l) and j
r 1 (p (l))j   j
r 1 (p (h))j = 1, the
set 
r 1(p) must equal to 
r 1 (p (h)) or to 
r 1 (p (l)) : In both cases, it must be p (h) <  r 1 and
p (l) <  r 1. Otherwise, since  2 ((T ); 1), the SMCr does not hold for any xr(l) 2 [0; 1].
If j
r 1(p (l))j   j
r 1(p (h))j > 0, then ~Ur 1 (p(l))   ~Ur 1 (p(h)) 6= 0. Hence, in order to have
no-learning, it must be that 
r 1(p (l)) = 
r 1(p (h)). Additionally, it must be either p (h) ; p (l) 2
[ r 1; 1], or p (h) ; p (l) 2 [0;  r 1) : Otherwise, ~Ur 1 (p(l))  ~Ur 1 (p(h)) 6= 0.
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B.10 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Consider a message set Mr with two possible messages f"take  it"; "leave  it"g ; a mech-
anism with an allocation given by
xr(mr) =
(
1 if mr = take  it;
0 if mr = leave  it; ; mr 2Mr;
probabilities of observing each message dened by
q^i(take  it)  qixr(h) + (1  qi)xr(l);
q^i(leave  it)  1  q^i(take  it);
and the posteriors of facing a high-type buyer when observing "take  it", p^(take  it), and the one
when observing "leave  it", p^(leave  it), are given by Bayes rule.
When p < r the optimal direct selling mechanism has allocations xr(h) = xr(l) = 1, then, by
denition, q^H(take   it) = 1, q^L(take   it) = 1 and p^(take   it) = p. It follows that continuation
values with the price posting are equal than under the direct mechanisms, i.e. Ui;r 1(p^(take  it)) =
Ui;r 1(p(h)) for both types and Vr 1(p^(take   it)) = Vr 1(p(h)). Using a price w^r(take   it) = L,
also instant payo¤s under both mechanisms are equal for every player.
When p  r the optimal direct selling mechanism has payments wr(h) = H and wr(l) = 0,
or wr(h) = H   r 1 and wr(l) = 0; with allocations xr(h) = 1 and xr(l) = 0. It follows
that, q^H(take   it) = qH and q^L(take   it) = qL and p^(take   it) = p(h) and p^(leave   it) = p(l).
Again, continuation values are equal for both mechanisms, i.e. Ui;r 1(p^(take   it)) = Ui;r 1(p(h)),
Ui;r 1(p^(leave   it)) = Ui;r 1(p(l)), Vr 1(p^(take   it)) = Vr 1(p(h)) and Vr 1(p^(leave   it)) =
Vr 1(p(l)). Using w^r(take   it) = wr(h), also instant payo¤s under both mechanisms are equal for
every player.
Then, for every prior, it is possible to implement an outcome (q^r; p^r;  ^r); where  ^r is a price
posting mechanism, which is payo¤ equivalent to the incentive e¢ cient outcome (qr; pr; r) that
solves (2.6).
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We organize the proof as follows. First, at point i), we show that V U (k) > V P (k). Second,
at ii), we show that V U (k) < V P (k). Since V P (k) and V U (k) are both continuous in k, points i)
and ii) imply that there exist at least one point k such that V P (k) = V U (k). Finally, at iii), we
show that this crossing point is unique.
i) Suppose k = k. In case of hiring at the unemployment pool, since she hires a young worker,
the rm with the lowest capital stock makes positive expected prots, i.e. V U (k) > 0. On the other
hand, V P (k) = 0 since the probability of successful poaching is zero.
ii) Equation (3.1) can be written as
V U (k) =
k	(p(k)) + kk;0(1 	(p(k))) + kk;1	(p(k))(k) 
1  	(p(k))(1  (k))(1  )  2 ; (C.1)
and equation (3.2) as
V P (k) =
1
1  
Z  
kkI ;1   kI
+ 	(p(kI))Prob(kI 2 B)(2 (kI)2 )R
	(p(x))Prob(x 2 B)(2 (x)2 )dF (x)
!
dF (kI): (C.2)
Suppose k = k. Since the rm has the highest possible underlying capital stock, no rival rm
can poach her worker tomorrow in case of going to the pool today, i.e (1   (k)) = 0. She has not
incentives to distort her technology, and she must have chosen (p; 0). Hence, 	k(p) = p and, since
kk;0(1 	(p(k))) + k;1	(p(k))) = k;
V U (k) =
k	(p(k)) + k
1  2 ;

k
1   :
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Since all rms were going to the pool and there were no poaching then Prob(kI 2 B) = Prob(x 2 B)
and (kI) = (x) = 1. Additionally, since every rm is choosing the same technology (p), 	(p(kI)) =R
	(p(x))dF (x) and kI ;1 = 1. Then, suppose that a rm with capital stock k, when her old worker
dies, deviates and decides to poach. Hence, she makes,
V P (k) =
1
1  
Z
(k   kI)+dF (kI)

:
Solving we get,
V P (k) =
1
1  

k  
k + k
2

:
To be V P (k) > V U (k),
kp  p
k + k
2
> k;
which is true for k > k1 2 .
iii) Suppose some k 2 (k; k).
Taking the derivative of V U (k) w.r.t. k (by the Envelope Theorem we need to consider only the
direct e¤ects; technologies have been optimally chosen at t = 0.) we get
@
@k
V U (k) =
	(p(k)) + (1 	(p(k)))k;0 + 	(p(k))k;1(k) 
1  (1  )	(p(k))(1  (k))  2
+
k	(p(k))k;1
0(k) 
1  (1  )	(p(k))(1  (k))  2
  
0(k)	(p(k))(1  )k [	(p(k)) + (1 	(p(k)))k;0] 
1  (1  )	(p(k))(1  (k))  22
  
0(k)	(p(k))(1  )k [	(p(k))k;1(k)] 
1  (1  )	(p(k))(1  (k))  22 :
To know if the derivative is positive or negative we compare,
	(p(k))+(1 	(p(k)))k;0 + 	(p(k))k;1(k) + k	(p(k))k;10(k) 
0(k)	(p(k))(1  )k [	(p(k)) + (1 	(p(k)))k;0] 
1  (1  )	(p(k))(1  (k))  2
+
0(k)	(p(k))(1  )k [	(p(k))k;1(k)] 
1  (1  )	(p(k))(1  (k))  2 :
When  ! 1, the RHS have an indeterminate form of 0=0. To solve it, we apply LHopital getting,
0(k)	(p(k))k [	(p(k)) + (1 	(p(k)))k;0 +	(p(k))k;1(k)]
2 	(p(k))(1  (k)) :
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Comparing this result with k	(p(k))k;10(k) (the last positive term at (??) when  ! 1), we get 
k	(p(k))k;1
0(k)

(2 	(p(k))(1  (k))) 
0(k)	(p(k))k [	(p(k)) + (1 	(p(k)))k;0 +	(p(k))k;1(k)]
because k;1  k;0 and k;1  	(p(k)), both due to p(k)  q(k). It follows that @@kV U (k)  0 when
 ! 1.
On the other hand,
V P (k) =
1
1  
Z  
kkI ;1   kI
+ 	(p(kI))Prob(kI 2 B)(2 (kI)2 )R
	(p(x))Prob(x 2 B)(2 (x)2 )dF (x)
!
dF (kI);
can be written as
V P (k) =
1
1  
Z  (k)
k
 
kkI ;1   kI
 	(p(kI))Prob(kI 2 B)(2 (kI)2 )R
	(p(x))Prob(x 2 B)(2 (x)2 )dF (x)
!
dF (kI);
because kkI ;1   kI > 0 when kI <  (k).
Taking the derivative of this last expression of V P (k) w.r.t. k,1
@
@k
V P (k) =
1
1  
Z  (k)
k
kI ;1
 
	(p(kI))Prob(kI 2 B)(2 (kI)2 )R
	(p(x))Prob(x 2 B)(2 (x)2 )dF (x)
!
dF (kI):
Hence @@kV
P (k) is also positive.
Notice that, since V U (k) = V P (k), using (C.1), (C.2) and the expression of @@kV
P (k) evaluated
1
@
@k
V P (k) =
"
1
1  
Z  (k)
k
kI ;1
 
	(p(kI))Prob(kI 2 B)( 2 (kI )
2
)R
	(p(x))Prob(x 2 B)( 2 (x)
2
)dF (x)
!
dF (kI)
#
+
"
k
1  
@
@k
Z  (k)
k
kI ;1
 
	(p(kI))Prob(kI 2 B)( 2 (kI )
2
)R
	(p(x))Prob(x 2 B)( 2 (x)
2
)dF (x)
!
dF (kI)
#
 
"
1
1  
@
@k
Z  (k)
k
kI
 
	(p(kI))Prob(kI 2 B)( 2 (kI )
2
)R
	(p(x))Prob(x 2 B)( 2 (x)
2
)dF (x)
!
dF (kI)
#
;
where the di¤erence of last two terms is equal zero.
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at k, we can write @@kV
U (k) evaluated at k as equal to
@
@k
V P (k)  1
(1  )k
Z  (k)
k
kI
 
	(p(kI))Prob(kI 2 B)(2 (kI)2 )R
	(p(x))Prob(x 2 B)(2 (x)2 )dF (x)
!
dF (kI)
+
k	(p(k))k;10(k) 
1  (1  )	(p(k))(1  (k))  2
  
0(k)	(p(k))(1  )k [	(p(k)) + (1 	(p(k)))k;0] 
1  (1  )	(p(k))(1  (k))  22
  
0(k)	(p(k))(1  )k [	(p(k))k;1(k)] 
1  (1  )	(p(k))(1  (k))  22 :
This last expression is lower than @@kV
P (k) since, when  ! 1, 1=[(1  )k]!1 and the di¤erence
among second to fourth line (after applying LHopital to solve indetermination of the form 0=0 and
some simplications) gives a positive but nite value.
It follows that at every crossing point k the slope of V P (k) is larger than the one of V U (k).
Therefore, k must be unique.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. From Proposition 3, we know that all k  k poaches from rms that went to the unem-
ployment pool (from those rms with a capital stock k  k). Thus, rms with k  k are not being
poached by other poaching rms, i.e. (k)=1. Since these poaching rms expect to poach high-skill
workers and they do not have incentives to distort to avoid poaching, they must be choosing p.
On the other hand, the rm with k can poach from every rm with at most a capital stock ~k
equal to k~k;1   ) with ! 0+. Hence, every rm with k  k~k;1) cannot be poached, i.e. (k)=1.
If this limit capital stock is larger or equal to k, all rms between k and this limit capital stock
are chosen non distortion (as we argued above). Hence, let k1 be the min
n
k~k;1; k

o
.
Suppose k1 = k~k;1. Since (k) = 1 for those k
I 2 [k1; k),
V U (kI) =
kI	(p(kI)) + kIkI ;0(1 	(p(kI))) + kIkI ;1	(p(kI))
(1  2) :
Since,
kI ;0(1 	(p(kI))) = (1  p(kI)) and,
kI ;1	(p(k
I)) = p(kI);
then
V U (kI) =
kI	(p(kI)) + kI
(1  2) ;
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and its derivative with respect to q, k=(1   2) (  + (1  )) < 0 because the assumption  >
(1  )=. Hence, all rms with capital stock k  k1 do not distort and choose p.
From Proposition 3, a rm with capital stock k is the rm with the minimum capital who
poaches. From previous arguments, she must be choosing p. Her better o¤er to a rm kI is equal
to kkI ;1. Suppose that this rm with capital stock kI is choosing the maximum distortion, i.e.
p(kI) = p=(1 +  ) (which means kI ;1 = . The better counter o¤er that this incumbent can make
is equal to kI . Then, every kI such that kI  k cannot deter poaching even with the worst
technology. Then, they have (kI) = 0.
Since (kI) = 0,
V U (kI) =
kI	(p(kI)) + kI(1  p(kI))
(1  (1  )	kI (p(kI)  2)
;
Its derivative with respect to q is
kI(  + (1  ) +   )
(1  (1  )	kI (p(kI)  2)
  (
2   )[kI	(p(kI)) + kI(1  p(kI))]
(1  (1  )	kI (p(kI)  2)2
:
The ratio,
kI(  + (1  ) +   )(1  (1  )	kI (p(kI)  2)
(2   )[kI	(p(kI)) + kI(1  p(kI))] ;
after taking the limit for  ! 1 (using LHopital to solve the indetermination 0=0), is equal to
(1  )(p(kI)+ q(kI)(1  )  2)
(  + (1  ))(q(kI)(1  ) + ) :
Previous ratio is lower than 1 (and as consequence, @@qV
U (kI) < 0) if 1  p < 1    2 .
Therefore, when 1   p < 1    2 , active rms with k  k nd optimal not to distort at all,
choosing p.
On the other hand, when 1 p  1   2 ,active rms with k  k choose some positive distortion,
i.e. p(k)  p.
Remaining rms that go to the unemployment pool for a worker (those k 2 (k; k1)) are able to
stop poaching by distorting their technology. So, they are choosing some p(k)  p.
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